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my guest today is lou elizondo who is a

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former senior

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intelligence official a disclosure

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advocate a national security expert

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and perhaps most interestingly the

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former director of the pentagon's ufo

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slash uap

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program known as atip aatip

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so uh lou thank you very much for being

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here it's been

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a bit of a challenge getting some of the

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key figures in the uap

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world to talk so thank you very much for

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agreeing to be here

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mick it's my pleasure and uh you give me

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too much credit for calling me a key

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figure in the uap

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topic um you know that i think there's a

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lot of people that probably deserve that

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credit

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um you know i'm probably like you i'm

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i'm bespoke in a much greater

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greater wheel well i think uh people

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will disagree with you there but

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uh thank you for your humility uh and

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we've got a lot of material to cover and

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lots of questions and i'm going to try

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to take things kind of roughly

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chronologically

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but first of all i wonder if you could

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just give a one or two sentence

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description of what you think

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a uap is what's your personal definition

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of a uap

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wow uh well nick i think that definition

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is

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with our understanding

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um you know there was a time in in our

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history

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and i'll try to be brief with this but

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it's it's not a it's not a simple

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question

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uh there was a time in our in our in in

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our world where anything that wasn't a

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bird that we saw in our sky and it

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wasn't a star

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uh was was mysterious right um these

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these supposed traveling stars and they

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turned out to be planets and then of

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course

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comets uh later on that had this this

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almost supernatural

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uh um type of of

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of identity if you will uh where where

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if you saw a comet in the sky

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some people thought it was it was a sign

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of of of things to come

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it was foreboding and it would cause

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sickness and disease

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uh you know that was a by definition a

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uap and then of course we began to

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understand that and

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and uh then you have um well you have

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in the in the 1940s you have these these

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cargo religions that were

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established in the south pacific based

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upon world war

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ii aircraft flying over these remote

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portions of the

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of the south pacific sea flying over an

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island maybe dropping some provisions

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and uh you know that was a uap right

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they were

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heaven dropping off

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food for for the people on the islands

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um

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and that was very much by definition of

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uap and so

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it's hard to say what what is a uap

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because i think

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as we gain additional understanding uh

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into

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um a lot of what was considered uap

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before

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is not a uap anymore anything by

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definition is

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is an unidentified aerial phenomenon

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until it isn't you know i think i think

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the definition of uap is a moving target

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um and what was once a uap is now um

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something you know that can be explained

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um for me

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anything can be a uap until it's not if

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that makes sense

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right yeah yeah so uh

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you know let's talk a bit about atip and

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kind of go back in time to

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around i guess 2007 when you first

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joined

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the program which at the time was called

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orsap aawsap i think the advanced

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aerospace weapons

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yes um what were you actually hired to

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do when you first

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what was your what you were tasked to do

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when you first joined

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uh either osap or you know the

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prototypical

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atip program back then i was asked

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simply to establish a

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a comprehensive security and

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counterintelligence

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portfolio within the greater construct

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my background is as a

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counterintelligence officer

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uh to a lot of people they look at them

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they say oh it's disinformation that's

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actually not really what

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counter intelligence does i think that's

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uh a bit of uh

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um a misunderstanding

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counterintelligence is really

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understanding what the enemy knows about

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us

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to put it very simply i've often told

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people it's like playing a game with

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chess

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and foreign intelligence is learning

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what the pieces on the opposite side of

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the chessboard can do

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counterintelligence is knowing what your

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opponent knows about your chess pieces

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and what they can do

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uh that's a very oversimplified way of

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looking at it but my my job was to set

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up a security

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program within that construct to a

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protect the information we have

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and b to figure out if the enemy is

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collecting information on us

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about that that portfolio so you're kind

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of an anti-spying

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person you're trying to protect uh and

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also do counter espionage essentially

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yeah that's exactly that's that's

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typically most of the job of of counter

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intelligence

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is you use the same techniques as you do

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in in foreign intelligence collection

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and human intelligence

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but you're doing it for a slightly

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different purpose it's it's the other

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side of the coin if you will of

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intelligence operations so when you when

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you first joined uh or separate

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uh what did you actually understand the

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program to be about what would you say

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was the purpose of

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of the program back then well initially

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i didn't have any understanding

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they didn't tell me what it was until

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until after i had a meeting with the

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director and then it became very clear

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to me

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uh that we were dealing with with with a

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topic involving

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some some very advanced technology that

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we we really didn't have a

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a good understanding now was it clear to

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you from the start that

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it was about uh the study of uaps

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well again let me let me say it again

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initially when i was first approached i

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had no idea what it was about

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um maybe i wasn't clear i apologize

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about no i mean but after

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after your conversation with the

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director uh did he tell you

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we are studying uaps yeah it was it was

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very very clear that we were we were

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studying uaps that's correct

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we weren't studying advanced aircraft we

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were studying right

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something that really fell outside of

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the normal or traditional understanding

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of aircraft technology so

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when you look at like the the history of

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atip and uh uh

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and norsap before that uh you you you

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see things like there's the solicitation

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document for the original osap program

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and uh they don't mention uaps uh they

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just talk about

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uh technology over the next uh 40 years

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i think you know advanced aerospace

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technology and speculative things like

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you know warp drives and quantum

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technology

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why why wasn't anything mentioned about

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that type of thing uh in the initial

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solicitations and the initial

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descriptions for example harry reid's

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letter

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of 2009 uh doesn't mention uaps at all

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even even like by

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by inference i think was that kind of a

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a secret part of the program

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no i mean it we do let's look at the

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dirts most of them were unclassified

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right we do

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scientific and academic solicitations

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for studies all the time

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we don't necessarily tell the sign when

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we say we'd like to know the friction

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coefficient of a reentry vehicle coming

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in at

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let's say an altitude of 250 000 feet at

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a velocity of 17 000 miles an hour at an

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angle of let's say 60 degrees

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you know what what type of material can

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withstand that

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and and the reason why you might ask

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that you don't necessarily

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in an unclassified realm tell the

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scientific communities because we're

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trying to look at

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uh enemy icbm missiles coming in on

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reentry right so

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right you don't when you're putting out

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an unsolicited when you're putting out

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an unclassified

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um solicitation for a study you have to

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understand that at the unclassified

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level

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anybody can read that and and so from an

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opsec or operational security

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perspective

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you have to be very mindful of of

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who's going to see it and so it's very

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very common practice in the us

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government we put out these studies all

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the time and we don't necessarily tell

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people why

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when you look at the studies

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holistically and you realize we're

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talking about warp drive and

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advanced materials and whatnot then you

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begin to understand that okay we're

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talking about really advanced technology

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why would we would be why would we be

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interested in that well

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clearly from a national security and

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intelligence perspective

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and you know what what are we interested

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in well as it turns out

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as as now everybody knows it was part of

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the a-tip program and part of the

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part of the study so when uh um harry

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reid like

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he sent this letter to the deputy

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secretary of defense secretary lin

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in 2009 uh it was this essentially kind

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of a public relations thing then

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was there some kind of back channel

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thing where he also told secretary lin

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that the the reason we are studying

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these things is that we are studying

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uaps it's not it's not necessarily just

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speculative technology we've seen these

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things in existence and we want to

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figure out how to do them

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would he have to so i told him i can't

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speak on behalf of secretary i'm sorry

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of

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he's an incredible human being but i

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can't answer that question for him but

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what i can say is

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once again you had mentioned why isn't

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the term uap

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in in that letter well again look at the

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classification of that letter that

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letter doesn't isn't classified there's

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no classification marking on it

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so once again you know that's going to

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go through a whole bunch of folks to

286
00:09:39,430 --> 00:09:37,680
coordinate that memo by the time it gets

287
00:09:41,269 --> 00:09:39,440
to the deputy secretary

288
00:09:43,590 --> 00:09:41,279
and so what you don't want to do again

289
00:09:45,750 --> 00:09:43,600
for operational security reasons opsec

290
00:09:48,230 --> 00:09:45,760
and infosec and other things

291
00:09:49,910 --> 00:09:48,240
you don't want to give away more than

292
00:09:51,030 --> 00:09:49,920
you absolutely have to with the

293
00:09:53,110 --> 00:09:51,040
understanding that

294
00:09:54,790 --> 00:09:53,120
there were classified briefings already

295
00:09:57,110 --> 00:09:54,800
so deputy secretary lin

296
00:09:58,790 --> 00:09:57,120
already knew what this program was doing

297
00:09:59,670 --> 00:09:58,800
you didn't have to specify it and be

298
00:10:01,590 --> 00:09:59,680
redundant

299
00:10:03,030 --> 00:10:01,600
in an unclassified document if you're

300
00:10:05,110 --> 00:10:03,040
trying to protect i mean

301
00:10:06,710 --> 00:10:05,120
the basis of the memo itself was to

302
00:10:10,470 --> 00:10:06,720
establish a sap

303
00:10:11,829 --> 00:10:10,480
so in an unclassified type document the

304
00:10:14,310 --> 00:10:11,839
last thing you want to do

305
00:10:16,790 --> 00:10:14,320
is provide something classified that's

306
00:10:18,949 --> 00:10:16,800
so sensitive that it should be a sap

307
00:10:20,710 --> 00:10:18,959
and and yet reveal it in an unclassified

308
00:10:23,110 --> 00:10:20,720
document so it

309
00:10:23,829 --> 00:10:23,120
it's it's not it's not a leap of faith

310
00:10:25,509 --> 00:10:23,839
to to

311
00:10:28,790 --> 00:10:25,519
understand why you're not going to see

312
00:10:29,910 --> 00:10:28,800
necessarily the term uap or ufo in there

313
00:10:32,069 --> 00:10:29,920
as we now know

314
00:10:33,190 --> 00:10:32,079
that that the senator has come out and

315
00:10:35,430 --> 00:10:33,200
said as

316
00:10:37,350 --> 00:10:35,440
many others have including myself that

317
00:10:41,190 --> 00:10:37,360
the program has always been about

318
00:10:42,230 --> 00:10:41,200
the the the uap issue yeah so but would

319
00:10:44,069 --> 00:10:42,240
that uh

320
00:10:46,230 --> 00:10:44,079
i mean essentially i don't know exactly

321
00:10:48,630 --> 00:10:46,240
the terminology of sap from the

322
00:10:51,030 --> 00:10:48,640
beginning would it have been uh

323
00:10:52,470 --> 00:10:51,040
when you came on you know they told you

324
00:10:53,910 --> 00:10:52,480
this is the public face of the program

325
00:10:55,269 --> 00:10:53,920
and then there's the secret face of the

326
00:10:58,230 --> 00:10:55,279
program which is about

327
00:11:00,230 --> 00:10:58,240
about uaps i i can't discuss anything

328
00:11:03,030 --> 00:11:00,240
that's classified so there were portions

329
00:11:05,430 --> 00:11:03,040
of that effort that were classified or

330
00:11:06,790 --> 00:11:05,440
or or considered sap i i would not be

331
00:11:08,310 --> 00:11:06,800
able to have that conversation

332
00:11:11,590 --> 00:11:08,320
unfortunately

333
00:11:14,949 --> 00:11:11,600
in in a manner like this right so

334
00:11:16,069 --> 00:11:14,959
so you that was 2007 2008 it kind of

335
00:11:19,030 --> 00:11:16,079
transitioned into the

336
00:11:20,310 --> 00:11:19,040
uh the the a-tip program which i guess

337
00:11:21,829 --> 00:11:20,320
was kind of a was that a

338
00:11:23,750 --> 00:11:21,839
a refinement of the goals or a

339
00:11:25,430 --> 00:11:23,760
broadening of the goals

340
00:11:28,230 --> 00:11:25,440
no i think it was a refinement of the

341
00:11:28,949 --> 00:11:28,240
goals it was it was really a closing of

342
00:11:30,949 --> 00:11:28,959
the aperture

343
00:11:31,990 --> 00:11:30,959
where ossoff was a bit of a shotgun

344
00:11:35,190 --> 00:11:32,000
approach

345
00:11:37,430 --> 00:11:35,200
um a tip a tip took more of a

346
00:11:38,790 --> 00:11:37,440
of a concentrated more laser-focused

347
00:11:42,069 --> 00:11:38,800
approach really

348
00:11:42,470 --> 00:11:42,079
focusing on the nuts and bolts of what

349
00:11:46,710 --> 00:11:42,480
is it

350
00:11:49,829 --> 00:11:46,720
and how does it work okay so uh so

351
00:11:50,790 --> 00:11:49,839
you're working at uh at atip and uh at

352
00:11:53,269 --> 00:11:50,800
some point

353
00:11:55,190 --> 00:11:53,279
you become the director of eight tip uh

354
00:11:58,389 --> 00:11:55,200
when about did that happen

355
00:12:00,069 --> 00:11:58,399
2010 2010 so

356
00:12:01,430 --> 00:12:00,079
uh you'd been there like two or three

357
00:12:03,590 --> 00:12:01,440
years and

358
00:12:05,350 --> 00:12:03,600
so you're the director of atip what's

359
00:12:07,670 --> 00:12:05,360
your actual responsibilities and your

360
00:12:10,470 --> 00:12:07,680
kind of day-to-day responsibilities

361
00:12:10,870 --> 00:12:10,480
running atip sure well it was the same

362
00:12:15,430 --> 00:12:10,880
as

363
00:12:17,990 --> 00:12:15,440
you're managing a portfolio

364
00:12:19,430 --> 00:12:18,000
and sometimes uh it's it can be pretty

365
00:12:20,710 --> 00:12:19,440
boring sometimes you don't have any

366
00:12:21,829 --> 00:12:20,720
really anything to do within that

367
00:12:24,550 --> 00:12:21,839
portfolio

368
00:12:25,750 --> 00:12:24,560
other times uh it could be pretty pretty

369
00:12:27,990 --> 00:12:25,760
hair-raising and

370
00:12:29,990 --> 00:12:28,000
and pretty crazy so it really it

371
00:12:32,949 --> 00:12:30,000
depended on the day in the situation

372
00:12:34,550 --> 00:12:32,959
uh what information was coming in uh

373
00:12:35,829 --> 00:12:34,560
sometimes there was nothing to do and

374
00:12:37,590 --> 00:12:35,839
other times it was

375
00:12:39,110 --> 00:12:37,600
it was all hands on deck and what it was

376
00:12:42,389 --> 00:12:39,120
it was triaging information

377
00:12:42,790 --> 00:12:42,399
trying to determine if if if what is

378
00:12:46,069 --> 00:12:42,800
being

379
00:12:47,910 --> 00:12:46,079
encountered is is a a blue force

380
00:12:50,790 --> 00:12:47,920
something our own technology maybe we

381
00:12:52,389 --> 00:12:50,800
have some sort of capability that we're

382
00:12:53,910 --> 00:12:52,399
using or testing in the area we didn't

383
00:12:56,230 --> 00:12:53,920
do a very good job coordinating

384
00:12:57,509 --> 00:12:56,240
coordinating with other other elements

385
00:12:59,910 --> 00:12:57,519
uh within the department

386
00:13:00,629 --> 00:12:59,920
or is it a red force is it is there is

387
00:13:03,910 --> 00:13:00,639
there a

388
00:13:05,829 --> 00:13:03,920
detected enemy or or foreign adversarial

389
00:13:07,350 --> 00:13:05,839
technology in the area that we are aware

390
00:13:09,829 --> 00:13:07,360
of right uh

391
00:13:10,629 --> 00:13:09,839
or is it something else with the hope

392
00:13:13,110 --> 00:13:10,639
that

393
00:13:14,069 --> 00:13:13,120
you know it was one of the first two

394
00:13:15,910 --> 00:13:14,079
things

395
00:13:18,310 --> 00:13:15,920
it was only after through through an

396
00:13:21,590 --> 00:13:18,320
extensive and exhaustive process of

397
00:13:23,670 --> 00:13:21,600
of of deduction were we able to in some

398
00:13:25,590 --> 00:13:23,680
cases look at some of these and say okay

399
00:13:27,110 --> 00:13:25,600
these fall really outside the parameter

400
00:13:29,350 --> 00:13:27,120
of anything that we have and

401
00:13:30,230 --> 00:13:29,360
and that we're pretty sure that that our

402
00:13:31,750 --> 00:13:30,240
adversaries have

403
00:13:33,190 --> 00:13:31,760
and those were the ones that really now

404
00:13:35,430 --> 00:13:33,200
left your head scratching you have to do

405
00:13:36,949 --> 00:13:35,440
a lot of analysis and research on and

406
00:13:38,710 --> 00:13:36,959
get a whole bunch of folks involved with

407
00:13:40,389 --> 00:13:38,720
and say okay what what are we dealing

408
00:13:41,910 --> 00:13:40,399
with and by the way

409
00:13:43,750 --> 00:13:41,920
assuming this is what what what the

410
00:13:44,230 --> 00:13:43,760
cameras are seeing the radar seeing in

411
00:13:46,949 --> 00:13:44,240
the

412
00:13:47,670 --> 00:13:46,959
eyewitness are seeing what are some of

413
00:13:49,509 --> 00:13:47,680
the

414
00:13:51,269 --> 00:13:49,519
physics and technologies that could

415
00:13:53,030 --> 00:13:51,279
explain

416
00:13:56,310 --> 00:13:53,040
this type of performance characteristic

417
00:14:00,629 --> 00:13:58,310
so you say like when stuff is coming in

418
00:14:02,470 --> 00:14:00,639
uh was there kind of like a pipeline

419
00:14:04,230 --> 00:14:02,480
that kind of directed stuff to you was

420
00:14:06,389 --> 00:14:04,240
the kind of like uh you get pilot

421
00:14:07,590 --> 00:14:06,399
reports obviously of like pilots seeing

422
00:14:09,509 --> 00:14:07,600
things in the sky

423
00:14:11,430 --> 00:14:09,519
uh but were there like kind of reporting

424
00:14:13,590 --> 00:14:11,440
guidelines that would

425
00:14:14,870 --> 00:14:13,600
kind of direct that they were reporting

426
00:14:16,790 --> 00:14:14,880
channels they weren't reporting

427
00:14:17,670 --> 00:14:16,800
guidelines at the time sadly that's one

428
00:14:20,470 --> 00:14:17,680
of the things we

429
00:14:22,710 --> 00:14:20,480
really lacked there were several

430
00:14:24,629 --> 00:14:22,720
pipelines that had been established

431
00:14:26,470 --> 00:14:24,639
there were we were getting information

432
00:14:28,629 --> 00:14:26,480
through various channels

433
00:14:30,150 --> 00:14:28,639
because those channels knew that we were

434
00:14:32,949 --> 00:14:30,160
around the problem was

435
00:14:34,230 --> 00:14:32,959
it was a bit of a catch-22 the more you

436
00:14:35,750 --> 00:14:34,240
want people to report

437
00:14:37,110 --> 00:14:35,760
then the more they know who you are and

438
00:14:37,590 --> 00:14:37,120
what you're doing right and then the

439
00:14:40,629 --> 00:14:37,600
more

440
00:14:42,310 --> 00:14:40,639
upset issues you have so um

441
00:14:43,509 --> 00:14:42,320
you know it's it's kind of like going

442
00:14:45,110 --> 00:14:43,519
out and saying look if you see anything

443
00:14:45,430 --> 00:14:45,120
unusual report it well what does that

444
00:14:47,990 --> 00:14:45,440
mean

445
00:14:49,430 --> 00:14:48,000
unusual what if i see a big wave in the

446
00:14:51,350 --> 00:14:49,440
ocean if i see a

447
00:14:52,550 --> 00:14:51,360
manatee swimming across the bow of the

448
00:14:54,870 --> 00:14:52,560
ship if i see

449
00:14:56,230 --> 00:14:54,880
a russian submarine or or an interesting

450
00:14:57,269 --> 00:14:56,240
looking cloud what

451
00:14:59,670 --> 00:14:57,279
what does that mean something

452
00:15:01,350 --> 00:14:59,680
interesting right so uh that was always

453
00:15:02,870 --> 00:15:01,360
a challenge say well you know something

454
00:15:04,550 --> 00:15:02,880
that might be in the sky

455
00:15:05,990 --> 00:15:04,560
you know in the sky what do you mean or

456
00:15:08,629 --> 00:15:06,000
something might be under the boat

457
00:15:09,670 --> 00:15:08,639
just report and then we'll determine if

458
00:15:11,269 --> 00:15:09,680
it's interesting or not

459
00:15:13,030 --> 00:15:11,279
sounds like you you'd have to filter out

460
00:15:17,509 --> 00:15:13,040
a lot of stuff if you have kind of very

461
00:15:20,389 --> 00:15:17,519
kind of vague criteria for uh yeah

462
00:15:22,550 --> 00:15:20,399
yeah and and unfortunately it was not as

463
00:15:25,350 --> 00:15:22,560
as organized or structured as

464
00:15:26,389 --> 00:15:25,360
as i would like that we're seeing now

465
00:15:27,750 --> 00:15:26,399
where there's formal

466
00:15:29,590 --> 00:15:27,760
you know reporting change and there's

467
00:15:30,550 --> 00:15:29,600
policies and there's there's teams

468
00:15:32,310 --> 00:15:30,560
dedicated to

469
00:15:33,590 --> 00:15:32,320
triage this information and get it to

470
00:15:35,670 --> 00:15:33,600
the right people

471
00:15:37,670 --> 00:15:35,680
so say a pilot report comes in and he

472
00:15:39,670 --> 00:15:37,680
says like i i saw a

473
00:15:41,749 --> 00:15:39,680
cigar-shaped object in front of my craft

474
00:15:42,870 --> 00:15:41,759
and it followed me for a minute and then

475
00:15:44,870 --> 00:15:42,880
vanished

476
00:15:46,790 --> 00:15:44,880
and you got that report what would you

477
00:15:48,310 --> 00:15:46,800
do with that

478
00:15:49,509 --> 00:15:48,320
well first of all is you want to

479
00:15:51,430 --> 00:15:49,519
identify if there's any other

480
00:15:53,189 --> 00:15:51,440
cooperating information right is it

481
00:15:55,590 --> 00:15:53,199
is it one pilot or were there sever

482
00:15:56,629 --> 00:15:55,600
pilots was there any radar data

483
00:15:58,389 --> 00:15:56,639
collected and not just

484
00:16:00,550 --> 00:15:58,399
from that aircraft but were there other

485
00:16:01,829 --> 00:16:00,560
maybe sensitive platforms in the area

486
00:16:03,350 --> 00:16:01,839
that maybe even the pilot didn't even

487
00:16:04,310 --> 00:16:03,360
know about right that were operating in

488
00:16:05,910 --> 00:16:04,320
that same area

489
00:16:07,990 --> 00:16:05,920
that we could then pull that data and

490
00:16:10,629 --> 00:16:08,000
look at uh was there any

491
00:16:12,470 --> 00:16:10,639
pod camera footage for example or or gun

492
00:16:13,749 --> 00:16:12,480
camera footage available electro optical

493
00:16:15,430 --> 00:16:13,759
data that then we could

494
00:16:17,110 --> 00:16:15,440
you know compare and contrast that

495
00:16:17,509 --> 00:16:17,120
compared to the radar data compared to

496
00:16:19,990 --> 00:16:17,519
the

497
00:16:21,910 --> 00:16:20,000
eyewitness reports and kind of cross

498
00:16:22,389 --> 00:16:21,920
layer all that information to give us a

499
00:16:24,949 --> 00:16:22,399
better

500
00:16:25,749 --> 00:16:24,959
what we call a cop common operating

501
00:16:29,350 --> 00:16:25,759
picture

502
00:16:30,230 --> 00:16:29,360
um so was this uh like did you have like

503
00:16:32,710 --> 00:16:30,240
say a

504
00:16:33,509 --> 00:16:32,720
uh a task team you don't sit around a

505
00:16:35,269 --> 00:16:33,519
table and you

506
00:16:36,710 --> 00:16:35,279
go over it or was one person take it

507
00:16:38,710 --> 00:16:36,720
away and look at it or

508
00:16:40,949 --> 00:16:38,720
multiple no no we had a test team no we

509
00:16:42,629 --> 00:16:40,959
did absolutely right we had an internet

510
00:16:44,870 --> 00:16:42,639
a small interagency

511
00:16:46,629 --> 00:16:44,880
team of individuals who had very

512
00:16:47,749 --> 00:16:46,639
specialized training in certain things

513
00:16:50,150 --> 00:16:47,759
so some might be

514
00:16:51,269 --> 00:16:50,160
electro optical engineers right and they

515
00:16:54,310 --> 00:16:51,279
understand

516
00:16:55,590 --> 00:16:54,320
uh you know what a a a weather balloon

517
00:16:57,189 --> 00:16:55,600
looks like at 30

518
00:16:59,509 --> 00:16:57,199
000 feet from all different angles right

519
00:17:01,749 --> 00:16:59,519
you might have

520
00:17:03,509 --> 00:17:01,759
several aerospace engineers that can

521
00:17:05,189 --> 00:17:03,519
talk about performance characteristics

522
00:17:07,350 --> 00:17:05,199
at that altitude right because

523
00:17:08,309 --> 00:17:07,360
not all things behave the same way at

524
00:17:10,630 --> 00:17:08,319
altitudes right

525
00:17:12,069 --> 00:17:10,640
um and then you have other individuals

526
00:17:14,470 --> 00:17:12,079
i'll give you an example

527
00:17:15,990 --> 00:17:14,480
if i may make um and i've done this a

528
00:17:17,909 --> 00:17:16,000
few times

529
00:17:19,590 --> 00:17:17,919
this is a training aid that i that i've

530
00:17:20,870 --> 00:17:19,600
i've had for a very long time and i

531
00:17:23,270 --> 00:17:20,880
don't know if you can see that

532
00:17:25,029 --> 00:17:23,280
uh on camera but it's a profile of an

533
00:17:28,069 --> 00:17:25,039
aircraft and on the back of it

534
00:17:29,990 --> 00:17:28,079
is uh details of the aircraft from

535
00:17:31,750 --> 00:17:30,000
various different perspectives and

536
00:17:33,350 --> 00:17:31,760
you can see here here's some other ones

537
00:17:35,510 --> 00:17:33,360
here of different aircraft

538
00:17:37,110 --> 00:17:35,520
uh in this particular case front side

539
00:17:39,029 --> 00:17:37,120
bottom top you name it

540
00:17:42,390 --> 00:17:39,039
here's one of another aircraft from the

541
00:17:44,150 --> 00:17:42,400
bottom and the bottom line is that uh

542
00:17:45,669 --> 00:17:44,160
individuals in the department of defense

543
00:17:48,789 --> 00:17:45,679
many of them are trained

544
00:17:51,190 --> 00:17:48,799
to understand what enemy and

545
00:17:53,190 --> 00:17:51,200
adversarial and allied aircraft look

546
00:17:54,630 --> 00:17:53,200
like there's profiles and

547
00:17:57,350 --> 00:17:54,640
you have to be able to very quickly

548
00:17:59,909 --> 00:17:57,360
identify what we call friend or foe

549
00:18:01,270 --> 00:17:59,919
and and frankly your survival oftentimes

550
00:18:04,470 --> 00:18:01,280
depends upon that

551
00:18:07,830 --> 00:18:04,480
and so we had experts that understood

552
00:18:09,990 --> 00:18:07,840
what what enemy aircraft looked like

553
00:18:11,750 --> 00:18:10,000
their silhouettes if you will

554
00:18:12,950 --> 00:18:11,760
from various different perspectives

555
00:18:14,310 --> 00:18:12,960
under various different weather

556
00:18:16,390 --> 00:18:14,320
conditions under

557
00:18:17,750 --> 00:18:16,400
all different types of scenarios in

558
00:18:19,990 --> 00:18:17,760
order to better

559
00:18:22,070 --> 00:18:20,000
um understand what we're dealing with

560
00:18:23,750 --> 00:18:22,080
and sometimes we were lucky because they

561
00:18:26,470 --> 00:18:23,760
would come up and say look actually

562
00:18:27,350 --> 00:18:26,480
what you're seeing here is an su-22 for

563
00:18:30,230 --> 00:18:27,360
example

564
00:18:31,510 --> 00:18:30,240
uh doing a 60 degree maneuver uh

565
00:18:33,750 --> 00:18:31,520
probably about a 3g

566
00:18:35,190 --> 00:18:33,760
turn at this altitude and this is why

567
00:18:35,590 --> 00:18:35,200
you're you're you're seeing what you're

568
00:18:37,990 --> 00:18:35,600
seeing

569
00:18:38,630 --> 00:18:38,000
right and that that case where oh kind

570
00:18:41,909 --> 00:18:38,640
of

571
00:18:42,390 --> 00:18:41,919
close the book and say okay great you

572
00:18:44,150 --> 00:18:42,400
know

573
00:18:45,750 --> 00:18:44,160
that's that's the plausible answer that

574
00:18:49,029 --> 00:18:45,760
we're dealing with here

575
00:18:51,110 --> 00:18:49,039
um but in other cases you know it

576
00:18:52,150 --> 00:18:51,120
it it really was it was as i've said

577
00:18:55,270 --> 00:18:52,160
before such a

578
00:18:56,150 --> 00:18:55,280
such a effort of mental gymnastics to

579
00:18:59,750 --> 00:18:56,160
try to come

580
00:19:02,950 --> 00:18:59,760
up with uh what it could have been

581
00:19:06,310 --> 00:19:02,960
that um it was it was extremely unlikely

582
00:19:08,390 --> 00:19:06,320
right right so you would you have like

583
00:19:10,230 --> 00:19:08,400
uh you know an official designation that

584
00:19:13,669 --> 00:19:10,240
this has been determined to be

585
00:19:16,390 --> 00:19:13,679
unidentified or determined to be a uap

586
00:19:17,510 --> 00:19:16,400
yes correct okay yeah that's it there

587
00:19:20,310 --> 00:19:17,520
was a threshold and once

588
00:19:22,470 --> 00:19:20,320
once you met that threshold uh and

589
00:19:24,230 --> 00:19:22,480
that's why the five observables were so

590
00:19:26,950 --> 00:19:24,240
important for us because

591
00:19:27,830 --> 00:19:26,960
we we knew what traditional aircraft

592
00:19:31,430 --> 00:19:27,840
could do

593
00:19:33,909 --> 00:19:31,440
and technology we knew what um

594
00:19:35,029 --> 00:19:33,919
you know very exotic technology but

595
00:19:38,150 --> 00:19:35,039
still

596
00:19:38,870 --> 00:19:38,160
technology that that we had could do we

597
00:19:41,110 --> 00:19:38,880
were aware

598
00:19:42,789 --> 00:19:41,120
of the technology we were developing and

599
00:19:44,230 --> 00:19:42,799
what its performance characteristics

600
00:19:46,950 --> 00:19:44,240
were and it's only when

601
00:19:48,070 --> 00:19:46,960
you you really got outside of that

602
00:19:49,510 --> 00:19:48,080
paradigm

603
00:19:50,950 --> 00:19:49,520
and you had something that was far

604
00:19:52,870 --> 00:19:50,960
exceeding those performance

605
00:19:55,110 --> 00:19:52,880
characteristics if you will well beyond

606
00:19:56,549 --> 00:19:55,120
that envelope of not of not of only what

607
00:19:58,789 --> 00:19:56,559
we're what we have now but

608
00:20:00,310 --> 00:19:58,799
what we're trying to build in the future

609
00:20:02,710 --> 00:20:00,320
um that's when you

610
00:20:03,750 --> 00:20:02,720
really were stuck with with with the

611
00:20:07,190 --> 00:20:03,760
difficult

612
00:20:08,470 --> 00:20:07,200
um you know idea that maybe maybe we're

613
00:20:10,390 --> 00:20:08,480
dealing with something else

614
00:20:12,630 --> 00:20:10,400
um again trying not to describe an

615
00:20:15,190 --> 00:20:12,640
origin very roughly like how

616
00:20:16,149 --> 00:20:15,200
how many kind of i guess uh certified

617
00:20:18,549 --> 00:20:16,159
uaps

618
00:20:19,430 --> 00:20:18,559
uh would you have come across in your

619
00:20:21,830 --> 00:20:19,440
your time at

620
00:20:22,950 --> 00:20:21,840
daytime unfortunately more than than

621
00:20:24,789 --> 00:20:22,960
we're comfortable with

622
00:20:26,230 --> 00:20:24,799
uh you know we wanted to find a solution

623
00:20:28,470 --> 00:20:26,240
for all of them unfortunately i can't

624
00:20:30,789 --> 00:20:28,480
give you an exact figure but enough

625
00:20:31,510 --> 00:20:30,799
where where uh the system became

626
00:20:34,549 --> 00:20:31,520
energized

627
00:20:37,350 --> 00:20:34,559
and and now you're seeing uh

628
00:20:39,029 --> 00:20:37,360
increased reporting coming out um if

629
00:20:40,870 --> 00:20:39,039
you're having classified briefings being

630
00:20:43,590 --> 00:20:40,880
provided to to

631
00:20:44,870 --> 00:20:43,600
elected officials in congress um because

632
00:20:47,510 --> 00:20:44,880
of that and again not

633
00:20:47,990 --> 00:20:47,520
we not ascribing an origin to this

634
00:20:50,230 --> 00:20:48,000
because i know

635
00:20:51,750 --> 00:20:50,240
people are always saying you know lou

636
00:20:53,510 --> 00:20:51,760
you said for the record you know

637
00:20:55,029 --> 00:20:53,520
before that it could be u.s it could be

638
00:20:56,710 --> 00:20:55,039
foreign adversarial

639
00:20:58,870 --> 00:20:56,720
but you think it's you know something

640
00:21:00,470 --> 00:20:58,880
different well yeah but that's why i

641
00:21:02,070 --> 00:21:00,480
don't like to offer my opinion because

642
00:21:03,990 --> 00:21:02,080
at the end of the day we have to let the

643
00:21:06,310 --> 00:21:04,000
data speak for itself we can't

644
00:21:08,149 --> 00:21:06,320
ascribe just because i think it might be

645
00:21:09,190 --> 00:21:08,159
something we have to really avoid that

646
00:21:10,950 --> 00:21:09,200
temptation

647
00:21:12,710 --> 00:21:10,960
and let the data speak for itself and at

648
00:21:13,830 --> 00:21:12,720
this point we simply just don't have

649
00:21:17,510 --> 00:21:13,840
enough data

650
00:21:21,190 --> 00:21:17,520
to make a some sort of of of conclusion

651
00:21:23,510 --> 00:21:21,200
as to what this is so uh

652
00:21:25,029 --> 00:21:23,520
okay i'm moving on from from a tip not

653
00:21:27,110 --> 00:21:25,039
to no we can really move away from it

654
00:21:28,950 --> 00:21:27,120
but like moving on to the the ttsa

655
00:21:31,270 --> 00:21:28,960
period of time uh the to the stars

656
00:21:34,470 --> 00:21:31,280
academy in 2017

657
00:21:36,789 --> 00:21:34,480
uh you resigned from from adept and

658
00:21:37,830 --> 00:21:36,799
you joined tom de long's to the stars

659
00:21:39,590 --> 00:21:37,840
academy

660
00:21:41,350 --> 00:21:39,600
and at the same time there was a new

661
00:21:43,190 --> 00:21:41,360
york times article that came out glowing

662
00:21:46,789 --> 00:21:43,200
auras and black money

663
00:21:49,029 --> 00:21:46,799
and i believe at least one of the videos

664
00:21:50,230 --> 00:21:49,039
i think was the gimbal video came out in

665
00:21:53,669 --> 00:21:50,240
that article

666
00:21:56,710 --> 00:21:53,679
and around that time uh ttsa

667
00:21:58,310 --> 00:21:56,720
was releasing that video and the the

668
00:22:01,270 --> 00:21:58,320
floor one video from the nimitz

669
00:22:01,750 --> 00:22:01,280
at the same time was this was this kind

670
00:22:04,710 --> 00:22:01,760
of like

671
00:22:06,149 --> 00:22:04,720
uh all happening together kind of

672
00:22:07,190 --> 00:22:06,159
coordinated you know you're talking to

673
00:22:08,789 --> 00:22:07,200
leslie keane

674
00:22:10,230 --> 00:22:08,799
and you're talking to tom delong and

675
00:22:10,710 --> 00:22:10,240
it's all kind of one big thing that's

676
00:22:13,830 --> 00:22:10,720
happening

677
00:22:14,310 --> 00:22:13,840
in this this time in fact i i never i

678
00:22:16,950 --> 00:22:14,320
never

679
00:22:19,029 --> 00:22:16,960
went to speak to to anybody in the press

680
00:22:20,549 --> 00:22:19,039
in fact i i didn't even want to

681
00:22:22,870 --> 00:22:20,559
i would my hope was that when i went

682
00:22:25,830 --> 00:22:22,880
with tom delong it was going to be

683
00:22:26,870 --> 00:22:25,840
somewhat subdued uh he asked me said hey

684
00:22:29,669 --> 00:22:26,880
do you mind

685
00:22:30,549 --> 00:22:29,679
i'm doing a a kind of an internet type

686
00:22:32,310 --> 00:22:30,559
announcement for

687
00:22:33,590 --> 00:22:32,320
for this effort to bring awareness do

688
00:22:35,669 --> 00:22:33,600
you mind saying a few words

689
00:22:36,630 --> 00:22:35,679
like yeah i saw and i thought steve

690
00:22:39,190 --> 00:22:36,640
justice was there

691
00:22:40,070 --> 00:22:39,200
and and we had some other folks i said

692
00:22:41,909 --> 00:22:40,080
yeah hal

693
00:22:43,350 --> 00:22:41,919
okay yeah i'm i'm happy to say a few

694
00:22:45,270 --> 00:22:43,360
things hal i've had worked with me

695
00:22:48,149 --> 00:22:45,280
obviously on a tip

696
00:22:49,029 --> 00:22:48,159
um but i i did not reach out to the new

697
00:22:51,350 --> 00:22:49,039
york times

698
00:22:52,070 --> 00:22:51,360
it was not me who discussed with leslie

699
00:22:54,470 --> 00:22:52,080
kane

700
00:22:56,149 --> 00:22:54,480
initially anything about the program she

701
00:22:58,950 --> 00:22:56,159
had her own sources

702
00:23:00,710 --> 00:22:58,960
and somehow she had that video i did not

703
00:23:02,230 --> 00:23:00,720
provide it to her

704
00:23:03,590 --> 00:23:02,240
and honestly and i didn't ask where she

705
00:23:04,549 --> 00:23:03,600
got it because i i frankly didn't want

706
00:23:07,110 --> 00:23:04,559
to know

707
00:23:08,070 --> 00:23:07,120
um you know it really wasn't my business

708
00:23:10,230 --> 00:23:08,080
and and i don't

709
00:23:11,830 --> 00:23:10,240
want to you know overcomplicate things

710
00:23:13,110 --> 00:23:11,840
unnecessarily the bottom line is she

711
00:23:15,990 --> 00:23:13,120
asked me to meet with her

712
00:23:17,270 --> 00:23:16,000
i did i answered her questions um of

713
00:23:18,710 --> 00:23:17,280
course there were questions i couldn't

714
00:23:20,710 --> 00:23:18,720
because i'm not going to talk about

715
00:23:22,630 --> 00:23:20,720
anything that's classified

716
00:23:24,390 --> 00:23:22,640
it was my my impression she had spoken

717
00:23:25,909 --> 00:23:24,400
to other people quite a few other people

718
00:23:27,830 --> 00:23:25,919
before she had spoken to me because she

719
00:23:30,310 --> 00:23:27,840
was asking me some very pointed

720
00:23:31,909 --> 00:23:30,320
very relevant questions in fact a few i

721
00:23:33,830 --> 00:23:31,919
was a bit uncomfortable to answer

722
00:23:36,149 --> 00:23:33,840
um because it showed that she had a lot

723
00:23:38,230 --> 00:23:36,159
more insight into the topic than than

724
00:23:40,710 --> 00:23:38,240
i would have expected her to have so she

725
00:23:44,070 --> 00:23:40,720
she had a pretty decent understanding of

726
00:23:45,510 --> 00:23:44,080
of of of that effort already um and i

727
00:23:48,149 --> 00:23:45,520
suspect that there were people

728
00:23:48,870 --> 00:23:48,159
that had spoken to her so you were

729
00:23:51,830 --> 00:23:48,880
involved in

730
00:23:53,830 --> 00:23:51,840
getting the the videos declassified so

731
00:23:54,950 --> 00:23:53,840
that ttsa could use them

732
00:23:59,029 --> 00:23:54,960
and at the same time having them

733
00:24:00,710 --> 00:23:59,039
reviewed and so okay so this is let me

734
00:24:02,230 --> 00:24:00,720
that's a great question mick and i think

735
00:24:04,950 --> 00:24:02,240
there's a lot of confusion there people

736
00:24:06,789 --> 00:24:04,960
say well you got them declassified okay

737
00:24:08,310 --> 00:24:06,799
the portions of the videos that people

738
00:24:10,789 --> 00:24:08,320
see were never classified

739
00:24:11,990 --> 00:24:10,799
okay they were residing on a classified

740
00:24:13,990 --> 00:24:12,000
system

741
00:24:15,590 --> 00:24:14,000
but they were never classified the

742
00:24:18,390 --> 00:24:15,600
portions let me stay

743
00:24:20,230 --> 00:24:18,400
say it again the portions that that have

744
00:24:22,470 --> 00:24:20,240
been publicly released

745
00:24:23,350 --> 00:24:22,480
were never classified and are not

746
00:24:26,470 --> 00:24:23,360
classified

747
00:24:28,149 --> 00:24:26,480
okay so my part in that and it was after

748
00:24:30,149 --> 00:24:28,159
speaking with my office it was general

749
00:24:31,510 --> 00:24:30,159
consensus but i was a senior guy so as

750
00:24:34,549 --> 00:24:31,520
my signature

751
00:24:36,230 --> 00:24:34,559
was try to get these videos released the

752
00:24:38,549 --> 00:24:36,240
unclassified portions

753
00:24:39,269 --> 00:24:38,559
so they could be brought out to a wider

754
00:24:42,070 --> 00:24:39,279
audience

755
00:24:42,870 --> 00:24:42,080
for a more generalized distribution and

756
00:24:46,070 --> 00:24:42,880
analysis

757
00:24:47,430 --> 00:24:46,080
because we did not after banging our

758
00:24:49,510 --> 00:24:47,440
heads against the wall

759
00:24:50,710 --> 00:24:49,520
for for quite a few years on this type

760
00:24:53,590 --> 00:24:50,720
of stuff

761
00:24:54,470 --> 00:24:53,600
we realized that within the intelligence

762
00:24:57,669 --> 00:24:54,480
community

763
00:24:59,350 --> 00:24:57,679
we weren't we were we were we weren't

764
00:25:01,190 --> 00:24:59,360
getting the answers we needed

765
00:25:02,470 --> 00:25:01,200
nobody could unders nobody could tell us

766
00:25:04,950 --> 00:25:02,480
what was going on

767
00:25:06,870 --> 00:25:04,960
so we said look why don't we go ahead

768
00:25:08,789 --> 00:25:06,880
try to get these videos put out to a

769
00:25:10,470 --> 00:25:08,799
broader audience maybe industry partners

770
00:25:11,669 --> 00:25:10,480
and whatnot to come out and take a look

771
00:25:13,269 --> 00:25:11,679
at these things

772
00:25:14,789 --> 00:25:13,279
and see if they can help us with

773
00:25:16,710 --> 00:25:14,799
figuring out what the heck these things

774
00:25:17,830 --> 00:25:16,720
are if these are if they have ever seen

775
00:25:19,909 --> 00:25:17,840
anything like this before

776
00:25:22,070 --> 00:25:19,919
and and maybe there's a rational

777
00:25:23,830 --> 00:25:22,080
explanation that that you know

778
00:25:25,350 --> 00:25:23,840
for the life of us we just can't figure

779
00:25:29,909 --> 00:25:25,360
out yeah

780
00:25:32,710 --> 00:25:29,919
and so uh uh

781
00:25:33,590 --> 00:25:32,720
the you you filled out this i got this

782
00:25:37,190 --> 00:25:33,600
form here this

783
00:25:39,669 --> 00:25:37,200
1910 1910 yeah is this you did you fill

784
00:25:41,190 --> 00:25:39,679
this form out uh get it declassified

785
00:25:43,590 --> 00:25:41,200
well i can't see too well what you're

786
00:25:45,750 --> 00:25:43,600
holding up i presume it is the same one

787
00:25:48,710 --> 00:25:45,760
so i'm getting on good faith

788
00:25:50,549 --> 00:25:48,720
see if my camera can focus there it is

789
00:25:53,350 --> 00:25:50,559
uh

790
00:25:54,870 --> 00:25:53,360
yeah again i i i presume that's that's

791
00:25:58,070 --> 00:25:54,880
the same one

792
00:25:59,269 --> 00:25:58,080
yeah it's it says uh go fast gimbal and

793
00:26:03,510 --> 00:25:59,279
flare at the top of it

794
00:26:07,669 --> 00:26:03,520
yeah title yeah mpeg file times three

795
00:26:10,549 --> 00:26:07,679
yep right uh and now it says here like

796
00:26:12,950 --> 00:26:10,559
on the form there's a stamp that says uh

797
00:26:16,710 --> 00:26:12,960
cleared i'll focus in a sec there we go

798
00:26:19,110 --> 00:26:16,720
uh cleared for open publication

799
00:26:20,470 --> 00:26:19,120
now does that mean that it's basically

800
00:26:22,950 --> 00:26:20,480
anyone in the public can

801
00:26:24,470 --> 00:26:22,960
can have it and you can that's correct

802
00:26:26,070 --> 00:26:24,480
that's exactly what that means there's

803
00:26:29,669 --> 00:26:26,080
if you look at the actual

804
00:26:31,510 --> 00:26:29,679
dod directive i'm dobser there are only

805
00:26:32,950 --> 00:26:31,520
there is no initially when i ask them

806
00:26:34,630 --> 00:26:32,960
hey i'd like to keep this

807
00:26:36,230 --> 00:26:34,640
in very controlled channels their

808
00:26:38,149 --> 00:26:36,240
response to me was you can't do that

809
00:26:41,190 --> 00:26:38,159
either it's releasable to everybody

810
00:26:43,269 --> 00:26:41,200
or it's not so i said well that's fine

811
00:26:45,430 --> 00:26:43,279
i'm happy if you're okay with it being

812
00:26:47,190 --> 00:26:45,440
released to everybody the general public

813
00:26:50,070 --> 00:26:47,200
that's your call that's not my call

814
00:26:52,310 --> 00:26:50,080
and yeah there was some dispute over

815
00:26:54,470 --> 00:26:52,320
that i think some uh

816
00:26:56,470 --> 00:26:54,480
some spokesperson uh said that you had

817
00:26:59,430 --> 00:26:56,480
to agree to what it says

818
00:27:00,710 --> 00:26:59,440
on the form and on the form uh it says

819
00:27:05,269 --> 00:27:00,720
not for publication

820
00:27:06,870 --> 00:27:05,279
research and analysis only uh

821
00:27:09,029 --> 00:27:06,880
so because you don't you don't publish

822
00:27:09,510 --> 00:27:09,039
videos okay this is not a book so adopts

823
00:27:10,950 --> 00:27:09,520
are

824
00:27:12,310 --> 00:27:10,960
primarily if you look at the mission of

825
00:27:13,350 --> 00:27:12,320
dobson even though everything has to go

826
00:27:16,390 --> 00:27:13,360
through the security

827
00:27:17,830 --> 00:27:16,400
review for pre-publication review you

828
00:27:19,669 --> 00:27:17,840
you release videos you don't publish

829
00:27:20,149 --> 00:27:19,679
videos you publish books right you don't

830
00:27:21,750 --> 00:27:20,159
publish

831
00:27:23,669 --> 00:27:21,760
videos so that's why you're sitting

832
00:27:25,750 --> 00:27:23,679
there not for publication this is not

833
00:27:27,510 --> 00:27:25,760
we're not talking about a book this is

834
00:27:29,750 --> 00:27:27,520
for research and analysis these are

835
00:27:30,549 --> 00:27:29,760
videos that we want people to look at so

836
00:27:33,190 --> 00:27:30,559
they can tell us

837
00:27:35,669 --> 00:27:33,200
what it is is going on here and the

838
00:27:36,789 --> 00:27:35,679
emails exchanges you see between dobser

839
00:27:38,789 --> 00:27:36,799
and myself

840
00:27:39,990 --> 00:27:38,799
they say in their hey look you know we

841
00:27:41,590 --> 00:27:40,000
don't have a problem with these going

842
00:27:42,870 --> 00:27:41,600
out at all and in fact if you look at

843
00:27:45,350 --> 00:27:42,880
the dobson

844
00:27:47,350 --> 00:27:45,360
regulations that category when it says

845
00:27:51,029 --> 00:27:47,360
releasable to everybody

846
00:27:52,710 --> 00:27:51,039
that's that's that is in the definition

847
00:27:54,549 --> 00:27:52,720
of the actual adopts or little handbook

848
00:27:55,590 --> 00:27:54,559
that is publicly available for anybody

849
00:27:56,950 --> 00:27:55,600
to read

850
00:27:59,029 --> 00:27:56,960
and that by the way is not my stamp

851
00:28:00,830 --> 00:27:59,039
that's that stops your stamp yeah yeah

852
00:28:06,710 --> 00:28:00,840
so that means that they have

853
00:28:09,909 --> 00:28:08,630
this this you said these three segments

854
00:28:11,510 --> 00:28:09,919
of these videos were

855
00:28:12,950 --> 00:28:11,520
um you know not classified they were in

856
00:28:13,830 --> 00:28:12,960
a classified system and so you had to

857
00:28:15,990 --> 00:28:13,840
get them cleared

858
00:28:17,430 --> 00:28:16,000
to get off that classified system and

859
00:28:18,789 --> 00:28:17,440
you know you're saying segments and that

860
00:28:20,310 --> 00:28:18,799
kind of implies that there's

861
00:28:21,750 --> 00:28:20,320
uh longer versions of those videos

862
00:28:22,149 --> 00:28:21,760
available have you seen the longer

863
00:28:24,470 --> 00:28:22,159
version

864
00:28:25,350 --> 00:28:24,480
i i i can't go into that unfortunately

865
00:28:28,470 --> 00:28:25,360
um

866
00:28:31,750 --> 00:28:28,480
you know if if longer portions exist

867
00:28:34,070 --> 00:28:31,760
uh that's not for me to to discuss

868
00:28:34,950 --> 00:28:34,080
all right so i could say that go ahead

869
00:28:37,029 --> 00:28:34,960
i'm sorry the

870
00:28:38,470 --> 00:28:37,039
the title of the videos uh that they

871
00:28:41,510 --> 00:28:38,480
they list it here

872
00:28:44,789 --> 00:28:41,520
uh go fast gimbal and fleer where did

873
00:28:47,830 --> 00:28:44,799
those titles come from

874
00:28:50,710 --> 00:28:47,840
oh i couldn't tell you

875
00:28:52,230 --> 00:28:50,720
uh i mean here i mean if i could take a

876
00:28:53,350 --> 00:28:52,240
guess here flir is forward looking

877
00:28:56,389 --> 00:28:53,360
infrared

878
00:29:00,630 --> 00:28:59,510
but who comes up with these titles well

879
00:29:02,549 --> 00:29:00,640
usually who

880
00:29:05,110 --> 00:29:02,559
whoever the owner of the film is right

881
00:29:06,230 --> 00:29:05,120
so so when the film was first taken it's

882
00:29:08,950 --> 00:29:06,240
put on let's say

883
00:29:09,830 --> 00:29:08,960
let's take the nimitz for example uh

884
00:29:13,190 --> 00:29:09,840
that would be

885
00:29:16,230 --> 00:29:13,200
that video came to us already with with

886
00:29:17,669 --> 00:29:16,240
the the name on it and the metadata

887
00:29:20,230 --> 00:29:17,679
and everything else that's contained in

888
00:29:23,269 --> 00:29:20,240
that video so right

889
00:29:25,750 --> 00:29:23,279
whoever is the the originator of that

890
00:29:27,269 --> 00:29:25,760
um you know would be the one who usually

891
00:29:27,909 --> 00:29:27,279
usually assigns the name in the first

892
00:29:29,590 --> 00:29:27,919
place but

893
00:29:31,909 --> 00:29:29,600
do you personally know the significance

894
00:29:35,590 --> 00:29:31,919
of the three names

895
00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:35,600
uh i don't only what i would presume

896
00:29:39,350 --> 00:29:38,080
to be you know again fleeing right

897
00:29:40,389 --> 00:29:39,360
forward looking at me i don't think it

898
00:29:45,029 --> 00:29:40,399
stands for

899
00:29:48,549 --> 00:29:47,029
talking about the 1910 let's see if i

900
00:29:52,630 --> 00:29:48,559
can just get this up here

901
00:29:57,669 --> 00:29:52,640
uh right here it says

902
00:29:58,389 --> 00:29:57,679
uh uavs uavs balloons and other uas now

903
00:30:00,789 --> 00:29:58,399
uav is

904
00:30:03,350 --> 00:30:00,799
unmanned aerial vehicle uas would be in

905
00:30:06,389 --> 00:30:03,360
i think an unmanned aerial system

906
00:30:08,710 --> 00:30:06,399
and balloons why why did you mention

907
00:30:10,549 --> 00:30:08,720
those three things on the forum

908
00:30:12,149 --> 00:30:10,559
because when people are going to look at

909
00:30:13,950 --> 00:30:12,159
it they're going to say what is this

910
00:30:15,990 --> 00:30:13,960
and unfortunately that is an

911
00:30:17,830 --> 00:30:16,000
unclassified document

912
00:30:19,430 --> 00:30:17,840
understand we had been reeling from the

913
00:30:21,190 --> 00:30:19,440
wikileaks situation

914
00:30:23,350 --> 00:30:21,200
we knew that our systems had been

915
00:30:24,070 --> 00:30:23,360
compromised and we also had a very

916
00:30:26,389 --> 00:30:24,080
significant

917
00:30:28,549 --> 00:30:26,399
insider threat so the last thing i was

918
00:30:32,470 --> 00:30:28,559
going to do was try to compromise

919
00:30:35,269 --> 00:30:32,480
overtly an ongoing sensitive effort

920
00:30:37,389 --> 00:30:35,279
to the open public knowing that our

921
00:30:39,669 --> 00:30:37,399
systems could be compromised that is an

922
00:30:42,470 --> 00:30:39,679
unclassified document and i have to

923
00:30:44,389 --> 00:30:42,480
submit it in that unclassified manner

924
00:30:46,710 --> 00:30:44,399
i don't have any other option if you

925
00:30:48,630 --> 00:30:46,720
look at the 1910

926
00:30:51,590 --> 00:30:48,640
the directions are you have to provide

927
00:30:53,750 --> 00:30:51,600
this in an unclassified

928
00:30:55,190 --> 00:30:53,760
manner which is the 1910. you can't

929
00:30:58,149 --> 00:30:55,200
classify it so

930
00:30:58,870 --> 00:30:58,159
so how do you again this goes back to

931
00:31:02,070 --> 00:30:58,880
the same

932
00:31:03,509 --> 00:31:02,080
same logic with harry reid you can't put

933
00:31:05,509 --> 00:31:03,519
an unclassified

934
00:31:07,350 --> 00:31:05,519
memo to the deputy secretary of defense

935
00:31:11,110 --> 00:31:07,360
with classified information in it

936
00:31:13,830 --> 00:31:11,120
so how do you do that well you you can't

937
00:31:14,310 --> 00:31:13,840
so what you do to make sure that you are

938
00:31:16,070 --> 00:31:14,320
okay

939
00:31:18,389 --> 00:31:16,080
is you make sure that the oca the

940
00:31:19,830 --> 00:31:18,399
original classification authority

941
00:31:21,909 --> 00:31:19,840
is the one who's ultimately going to

942
00:31:24,310 --> 00:31:21,919
approve the release of that who does

943
00:31:26,310 --> 00:31:24,320
know the significance of those videos

944
00:31:27,590 --> 00:31:26,320
right and that's why you see in there

945
00:31:29,110 --> 00:31:27,600
where they said look you know

946
00:31:30,630 --> 00:31:29,120
you need to check with the original

947
00:31:32,789 --> 00:31:30,640
classification authority

948
00:31:34,149 --> 00:31:32,799
which was well not going to say it was

949
00:31:36,070 --> 00:31:34,159
but it went

950
00:31:37,430 --> 00:31:36,080
to that office and they turn around and

951
00:31:39,830 --> 00:31:37,440
said yes these are

952
00:31:40,950 --> 00:31:39,840
truly unclassified and in fact we took

953
00:31:44,070 --> 00:31:40,960
it a step further

954
00:31:46,070 --> 00:31:44,080
um my office because of of the

955
00:31:47,509 --> 00:31:46,080
the uniqueness of these videos we

956
00:31:49,269 --> 00:31:47,519
actually went to

957
00:31:51,990 --> 00:31:49,279
two of the most senior foreign

958
00:31:53,750 --> 00:31:52,000
disclosure officers fdos

959
00:31:56,310 --> 00:31:53,760
in the entire department of defense to

960
00:31:58,710 --> 00:31:56,320
have them actually review

961
00:31:59,990 --> 00:31:58,720
the videos and say okay even though now

962
00:32:02,230 --> 00:32:00,000
dobster has said they are

963
00:32:03,430 --> 00:32:02,240
unclassified and the oca has agreed that

964
00:32:04,470 --> 00:32:03,440
they aren't classified we have the

965
00:32:06,310 --> 00:32:04,480
release

966
00:32:08,070 --> 00:32:06,320
we want to do one extra level of due

967
00:32:10,070 --> 00:32:08,080
diligence just to make sure

968
00:32:11,750 --> 00:32:10,080
is there any possibility that releasing

969
00:32:12,950 --> 00:32:11,760
these videos if they come out to the

970
00:32:14,630 --> 00:32:12,960
public domain

971
00:32:16,389 --> 00:32:14,640
can cause some sort of compromise of

972
00:32:18,310 --> 00:32:16,399
national security information

973
00:32:19,909 --> 00:32:18,320
if it gets into foreign adversarial

974
00:32:20,470 --> 00:32:19,919
hands and that's why we went that extra

975
00:32:22,950 --> 00:32:20,480
step

976
00:32:24,870 --> 00:32:22,960
and we went why why why balloons why did

977
00:32:27,669 --> 00:32:24,880
you use balloons as a

978
00:32:29,350 --> 00:32:27,679
generic descriptor well let's go back to

979
00:32:31,669 --> 00:32:29,360
the beginning of our conversation

980
00:32:32,630 --> 00:32:31,679
uh which i i i think you agreed with me

981
00:32:35,430 --> 00:32:32,640
maybe maybe not

982
00:32:35,909 --> 00:32:35,440
that that anything is a uas until it's

983
00:32:41,430 --> 00:32:35,919
not

984
00:32:43,350 --> 00:32:41,440
unmanned aerial system well what does

985
00:32:44,310 --> 00:32:43,360
that mean well if it's not a human being

986
00:32:47,190 --> 00:32:44,320
inside it

987
00:32:48,710 --> 00:32:47,200
then it is technically a uas it is an

988
00:32:49,750 --> 00:32:48,720
unmanned it's aerial and it's just some

989
00:32:52,630 --> 00:32:49,760
sort of system

990
00:32:53,029 --> 00:32:52,640
same thing with uap so you know it's

991
00:32:56,310 --> 00:32:53,039
it's

992
00:32:57,590 --> 00:32:56,320
because we

993
00:32:59,750 --> 00:32:57,600
quite frankly don't know what we're

994
00:33:02,230 --> 00:32:59,760
dealing with now clearly in the videos

995
00:33:04,070 --> 00:33:02,240
we're probably looking at something that

996
00:33:05,750 --> 00:33:04,080
is not that um after an extensive

997
00:33:07,669 --> 00:33:05,760
analysis that was done and i know some

998
00:33:09,509 --> 00:33:07,679
people argue about that and that's fine

999
00:33:11,269 --> 00:33:09,519
well i'm just about to argue about that

1000
00:33:12,950 --> 00:33:11,279
actually sure because

1001
00:33:15,190 --> 00:33:12,960
i'm one of the people has done a lot of

1002
00:33:17,029 --> 00:33:15,200
analysis uh you know independently

1003
00:33:18,230 --> 00:33:17,039
on on these three videos and i like to

1004
00:33:19,029 --> 00:33:18,240
talk about them and kind of get your

1005
00:33:20,470 --> 00:33:19,039
take i don't

1006
00:33:23,509 --> 00:33:20,480
have you ever seen any of the videos

1007
00:33:26,230 --> 00:33:23,519
that i put out analyzing these videos

1008
00:33:27,190 --> 00:33:26,240
i i am aware of your work mr west okay

1009
00:33:29,190 --> 00:33:27,200
okay

1010
00:33:31,029 --> 00:33:29,200
all right so uh let's start with the

1011
00:33:35,029 --> 00:33:31,039
fleur video the nimitz video

1012
00:33:36,789 --> 00:33:35,039
and uh my hypothesis there is that it's

1013
00:33:39,350 --> 00:33:36,799
some kind of distant flying

1014
00:33:40,230 --> 00:33:39,360
uh plane or drone or something like that

1015
00:33:42,630 --> 00:33:40,240
and that

1016
00:33:43,830 --> 00:33:42,640
uh it doesn't make any sudden movements

1017
00:33:44,630 --> 00:33:43,840
now a lot of people that look at this

1018
00:33:46,149 --> 00:33:44,640
video it's kind of

1019
00:33:48,230 --> 00:33:46,159
this blurry video taken by chad

1020
00:33:49,669 --> 00:33:48,240
underwood it's very low resolution

1021
00:33:52,230 --> 00:33:49,679
and you see the thing kind of jumping

1022
00:33:54,230 --> 00:33:52,240
around but i think it always

1023
00:33:55,909 --> 00:33:54,240
coincides with a change in the camera

1024
00:33:57,430 --> 00:33:55,919
system and i did a detailed breakdown

1025
00:33:58,630 --> 00:33:57,440
where i went through the video one step

1026
00:34:00,310 --> 00:33:58,640
at a time

1027
00:34:01,909 --> 00:34:00,320
saw when the camera had changed or there

1028
00:34:04,870 --> 00:34:01,919
was some kind of camera rotation

1029
00:34:07,830 --> 00:34:04,880
or a lens change or change from um you

1030
00:34:11,109 --> 00:34:07,840
know ir to

1031
00:34:13,829 --> 00:34:11,119
tv mode and it was always

1032
00:34:15,669 --> 00:34:13,839
correlated with some kind of movement of

1033
00:34:16,869 --> 00:34:15,679
the object and a loss of lock and then a

1034
00:34:18,629 --> 00:34:16,879
regaining a block

1035
00:34:20,470 --> 00:34:18,639
until the final thing where there was

1036
00:34:21,669 --> 00:34:20,480
one big camera movement and there was a

1037
00:34:23,750 --> 00:34:21,679
loss of lock and it

1038
00:34:26,550 --> 00:34:23,760
just didn't regain the lock and then the

1039
00:34:29,750 --> 00:34:26,560
camera changed from tracking mode to

1040
00:34:31,589 --> 00:34:29,760
uh i believe the ground tracking mode

1041
00:34:36,550 --> 00:34:31,599
and then the object itself went off to

1042
00:34:39,909 --> 00:34:39,190
are you aware of like uh well well first

1043
00:34:41,829 --> 00:34:39,919
of all like

1044
00:34:43,349 --> 00:34:41,839
what do you think of that analysis if

1045
00:34:43,669 --> 00:34:43,359
you if you're familiar with this at all

1046
00:34:46,790 --> 00:34:43,679
and

1047
00:34:49,109 --> 00:34:46,800
do you think well i i think take it away

1048
00:34:50,230 --> 00:34:49,119
i think well i let me answer great

1049
00:34:51,430 --> 00:34:50,240
questions and you have a couple

1050
00:34:53,589 --> 00:34:51,440
questions there so i want to make sure

1051
00:34:56,710 --> 00:34:53,599
i'm thorough and answer them

1052
00:35:00,150 --> 00:34:56,720
appropriately do i think

1053
00:35:02,470 --> 00:35:00,160
your analysis is valuable absolutely

1054
00:35:03,910 --> 00:35:02,480
it's always valuable did we conduct our

1055
00:35:06,710 --> 00:35:03,920
own analysis

1056
00:35:07,190 --> 00:35:06,720
absolutely very comprehensive analysis

1057
00:35:09,670 --> 00:35:07,200
um

1058
00:35:10,470 --> 00:35:09,680
did we come up with the same conclusion

1059
00:35:14,069 --> 00:35:10,480
you did

1060
00:35:14,630 --> 00:35:14,079
we did not and my question to you would

1061
00:35:18,069 --> 00:35:14,640
be is

1062
00:35:20,470 --> 00:35:18,079
you're looking at the video um are you

1063
00:35:21,670 --> 00:35:20,480
certain that there's not other video or

1064
00:35:25,349 --> 00:35:21,680
perhaps that there's

1065
00:35:27,670 --> 00:35:25,359
also uh perhaps radar data

1066
00:35:28,630 --> 00:35:27,680
that correlates with what the pilot

1067
00:35:29,990 --> 00:35:28,640
testimony

1068
00:35:31,510 --> 00:35:30,000
that would be great but unfortunately

1069
00:35:33,349 --> 00:35:31,520
you know i've only got the video to go

1070
00:35:34,710 --> 00:35:33,359
by but my point there isn't really that

1071
00:35:37,030 --> 00:35:34,720
there may be other data

1072
00:35:38,390 --> 00:35:37,040
is that people are taking the video

1073
00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:38,400
itself

1074
00:35:45,430 --> 00:35:43,440
shows these things like chad underwood

1075
00:35:47,109 --> 00:35:45,440
says this video shows

1076
00:35:49,510 --> 00:35:47,119
the object flying off very rapidly at

1077
00:35:50,950 --> 00:35:49,520
the side within the the unidentified tv

1078
00:35:53,430 --> 00:35:50,960
program on the history channel

1079
00:35:54,630 --> 00:35:53,440
it was claimed that this video itself

1080
00:35:57,190 --> 00:35:54,640
was evidence

1081
00:35:58,150 --> 00:35:57,200
of the object flying off and i would put

1082
00:36:00,230 --> 00:35:58,160
it that the

1083
00:36:01,750 --> 00:36:00,240
video itself could be interpreted as

1084
00:36:04,790 --> 00:36:01,760
just a regular

1085
00:36:07,910 --> 00:36:04,800
object not making any sudden moves i

1086
00:36:10,710 --> 00:36:07,920
i think your interpretation is

1087
00:36:12,470 --> 00:36:10,720
is i think you're certainly entitled to

1088
00:36:14,230 --> 00:36:12,480
to your own opinions and your own

1089
00:36:16,470 --> 00:36:14,240
interpretation

1090
00:36:18,630 --> 00:36:16,480
i will tell you with my experience uh

1091
00:36:21,109 --> 00:36:18,640
take it for what it's worth

1092
00:36:22,630 --> 00:36:21,119
that was not the interpretation and we

1093
00:36:25,109 --> 00:36:22,640
look at things in the government we tend

1094
00:36:27,349 --> 00:36:25,119
to look at things holistically

1095
00:36:29,030 --> 00:36:27,359
we try to avoid single source reporting

1096
00:36:30,790 --> 00:36:29,040
uh from an intelligence perspective it's

1097
00:36:31,829 --> 00:36:30,800
kind of a no-no for us right just like

1098
00:36:33,430 --> 00:36:31,839
in reporter

1099
00:36:34,870 --> 00:36:33,440
and the world of reporting you never

1100
00:36:36,390 --> 00:36:34,880
look at a single source

1101
00:36:37,829 --> 00:36:36,400
um and so that's why it's important to

1102
00:36:38,829 --> 00:36:37,839
look at these videos in the greater

1103
00:36:41,270 --> 00:36:38,839
context

1104
00:36:43,109 --> 00:36:41,280
of um in the manner in which they were

1105
00:36:45,510 --> 00:36:43,119
taken and the circumstances so

1106
00:36:47,589 --> 00:36:45,520
you know anybody can look at a video and

1107
00:36:51,990 --> 00:36:47,599
we see all the time

1108
00:36:54,470 --> 00:36:52,000
videos that that show things that

1109
00:36:56,550 --> 00:36:54,480
appear to be marvelous and then turn out

1110
00:36:59,510 --> 00:36:56,560
to be not so much right

1111
00:37:00,710 --> 00:36:59,520
and then in hindsight uh there's also

1112
00:37:02,069 --> 00:37:00,720
other examples where you look at

1113
00:37:03,670 --> 00:37:02,079
something and something seems to be

1114
00:37:05,510 --> 00:37:03,680
fairly rudimentary

1115
00:37:06,950 --> 00:37:05,520
and all of a sudden you realize after

1116
00:37:09,910 --> 00:37:06,960
some careful analysis

1117
00:37:10,790 --> 00:37:09,920
that it's actually extraordinary um and

1118
00:37:12,950 --> 00:37:10,800
i would be

1119
00:37:14,069 --> 00:37:12,960
my caution to everybody anybody out

1120
00:37:16,310 --> 00:37:14,079
there is

1121
00:37:17,349 --> 00:37:16,320
when you're looking at a video

1122
00:37:19,349 --> 00:37:17,359
understand that

1123
00:37:20,630 --> 00:37:19,359
a video itself is only going to tell you

1124
00:37:22,470 --> 00:37:20,640
so much

1125
00:37:24,390 --> 00:37:22,480
and that's why you need additional

1126
00:37:25,349 --> 00:37:24,400
information to look at that can either

1127
00:37:28,870 --> 00:37:25,359
cooperate

1128
00:37:29,750 --> 00:37:28,880
or refute that information and based

1129
00:37:32,710 --> 00:37:29,760
upon

1130
00:37:33,190 --> 00:37:32,720
my experience in the a-tip program there

1131
00:37:35,589 --> 00:37:33,200
is

1132
00:37:37,510 --> 00:37:35,599
certainly additional information that

1133
00:37:39,109 --> 00:37:37,520
made it um

1134
00:37:40,310 --> 00:37:39,119
very very compelling and again people

1135
00:37:42,230 --> 00:37:40,320
are going to say well what is it lou why

1136
00:37:44,550 --> 00:37:42,240
don't you tell us i mean we want to know

1137
00:37:46,470 --> 00:37:44,560
well i i i can't but but that

1138
00:37:48,310 --> 00:37:46,480
information is starting to come out

1139
00:37:50,069 --> 00:37:48,320
and when you look at that data that's

1140
00:37:52,950 --> 00:37:50,079
compared to not only

1141
00:37:53,670 --> 00:37:52,960
what you see on the game camera footage

1142
00:37:56,710 --> 00:37:53,680
what you hear

1143
00:37:57,109 --> 00:37:56,720
with the eyewitness testimony what you

1144
00:38:00,790 --> 00:37:57,119
see

1145
00:38:03,109 --> 00:38:00,800
on the uh the hawkeye

1146
00:38:05,910 --> 00:38:03,119
radar information which is backed up by

1147
00:38:07,670 --> 00:38:05,920
the spy 1 radar data from the princeton

1148
00:38:10,230 --> 00:38:07,680
and possibly and i'm not going to say

1149
00:38:11,990 --> 00:38:10,240
yes or no other sensors that were in the

1150
00:38:14,550 --> 00:38:12,000
area at the time

1151
00:38:15,589 --> 00:38:14,560
now you've got a much more complete

1152
00:38:17,990 --> 00:38:15,599
picture of what's

1153
00:38:19,990 --> 00:38:18,000
actually going on it would be great if i

1154
00:38:21,510 --> 00:38:20,000
could get that picture of course but

1155
00:38:23,109 --> 00:38:21,520
unfortunately i'm i'm just like you know

1156
00:38:25,030 --> 00:38:23,119
a member of the public all i have access

1157
00:38:25,510 --> 00:38:25,040
to is this one video but let's move on

1158
00:38:28,230 --> 00:38:25,520
to the next

1159
00:38:29,990 --> 00:38:28,240
one and i respect that tremendously and

1160
00:38:31,990 --> 00:38:30,000
this is why mr west i wanted to have

1161
00:38:35,109 --> 00:38:32,000
this conversation with you because

1162
00:38:37,750 --> 00:38:35,119
i think i i think it's unfair for for

1163
00:38:39,589 --> 00:38:37,760
i think it's unfair for me to criticize

1164
00:38:41,750 --> 00:38:39,599
you and i think it's unfortunate i'd be

1165
00:38:44,069 --> 00:38:41,760
happy for you to criticize me

1166
00:38:46,069 --> 00:38:44,079
no it's not it's it's not a personal

1167
00:38:46,710 --> 00:38:46,079
thing i i think everybody is entitled to

1168
00:38:48,950 --> 00:38:46,720
i didn't mean that

1169
00:38:50,790 --> 00:38:48,960
i mean just criticize specific things

1170
00:38:52,390 --> 00:38:50,800
that i've said it's fine like if i've

1171
00:38:53,430 --> 00:38:52,400
said something that i you think is wrong

1172
00:38:54,630 --> 00:38:53,440
i'll be happy to be

1173
00:38:56,710 --> 00:38:54,640
pretty sure well there's a difference

1174
00:38:58,870 --> 00:38:56,720
between being critical analysis and

1175
00:39:02,870 --> 00:38:58,880
criticizing and and i don't think

1176
00:39:05,910 --> 00:39:04,950
okay uh the gimbal video is a bit more

1177
00:39:07,430 --> 00:39:05,920
self-contained

1178
00:39:09,030 --> 00:39:07,440
uh i think because there isn't that much

1179
00:39:10,550 --> 00:39:09,040
kind of uh other

1180
00:39:12,630 --> 00:39:10,560
stuff associated with it at least in

1181
00:39:15,270 --> 00:39:12,640
public uh the gimbal video

1182
00:39:16,630 --> 00:39:15,280
shows what looks like a flying saucer

1183
00:39:19,589 --> 00:39:16,640
type thing and it's got this

1184
00:39:20,310 --> 00:39:19,599
this this aura around it and that was

1185
00:39:22,630 --> 00:39:20,320
kind of

1186
00:39:24,390 --> 00:39:22,640
reflected in the the title of the new

1187
00:39:26,069 --> 00:39:24,400
york times article glowing auras and

1188
00:39:29,270 --> 00:39:26,079
black money

1189
00:39:31,270 --> 00:39:29,280
uh but the aura was later discovered to

1190
00:39:34,310 --> 00:39:31,280
be just kind of a standard artifact

1191
00:39:35,910 --> 00:39:34,320
of the infrared um

1192
00:39:37,750 --> 00:39:35,920
the infrared camera system is this thing

1193
00:39:40,150 --> 00:39:37,760
called an unsharp mask which uh

1194
00:39:42,310 --> 00:39:40,160
creates uh contrast in the boundaries

1195
00:39:43,910 --> 00:39:42,320
between light and dark uh

1196
00:39:46,390 --> 00:39:43,920
and yet this was something that was it

1197
00:39:47,910 --> 00:39:46,400
was promoted on the ptsa site that there

1198
00:39:48,230 --> 00:39:47,920
was an aura on the new york times thing

1199
00:39:51,589 --> 00:39:48,240
it was

1200
00:39:54,150 --> 00:39:51,599
unidentified why wasn't this discovered

1201
00:39:55,030 --> 00:39:54,160
if it's such a fairly simple thing that

1202
00:39:56,870 --> 00:39:55,040
it's uh

1203
00:39:58,790 --> 00:39:56,880
it's just an artifact of the camera even

1204
00:40:00,310 --> 00:39:58,800
jeremy corbell now admits that it's just

1205
00:40:01,990 --> 00:40:00,320
an artifact of the camera

1206
00:40:03,670 --> 00:40:02,000
why wasn't this discovered right from

1207
00:40:06,230 --> 00:40:03,680
the start

1208
00:40:07,510 --> 00:40:06,240
well because i i don't subscribe to that

1209
00:40:09,589 --> 00:40:07,520
i think you can

1210
00:40:10,790 --> 00:40:09,599
you can look at something and say oh

1211
00:40:13,670 --> 00:40:10,800
it's it's a

1212
00:40:14,550 --> 00:40:13,680
artifact of the of the infrared and heat

1213
00:40:16,870 --> 00:40:14,560
signature

1214
00:40:19,109 --> 00:40:16,880
but are you sure there was even a heat

1215
00:40:21,349 --> 00:40:19,119
signature creating that

1216
00:40:22,550 --> 00:40:21,359
i mean i don't know the physics what

1217
00:40:24,630 --> 00:40:22,560
creates that

1218
00:40:25,910 --> 00:40:24,640
and whether it is something naturally

1219
00:40:29,349 --> 00:40:25,920
occurring or not

1220
00:40:30,710 --> 00:40:29,359
um but there are other explanations what

1221
00:40:33,829 --> 00:40:30,720
you see on a camera you can say

1222
00:40:35,109 --> 00:40:33,839
well this explains that well but there's

1223
00:40:37,589 --> 00:40:35,119
other things that

1224
00:40:38,870 --> 00:40:37,599
do too and you're assuming that it had

1225
00:40:42,390 --> 00:40:38,880
it had a heat signature

1226
00:40:43,510 --> 00:40:42,400
right um because what do you mean by a

1227
00:40:45,190 --> 00:40:43,520
heat signature though i think there's a

1228
00:40:46,390 --> 00:40:45,200
lot of confusion as to what what a heat

1229
00:40:48,870 --> 00:40:46,400
signature means so

1230
00:40:50,710 --> 00:40:48,880
from your infrared so infrared in a

1231
00:40:53,589 --> 00:40:50,720
technical perspective you're looking at

1232
00:40:54,150 --> 00:40:53,599
at light wave energy below the visible

1233
00:40:57,589 --> 00:40:54,160
spectrum

1234
00:41:00,230 --> 00:40:57,599
of the red uh frequency right so infra

1235
00:41:01,510 --> 00:41:00,240
red which means below red and you're

1236
00:41:03,670 --> 00:41:01,520
usually typically

1237
00:41:06,230 --> 00:41:03,680
dealing with that type of signature can

1238
00:41:08,710 --> 00:41:06,240
be can be attributed to heat right

1239
00:41:09,349 --> 00:41:08,720
infrared you use like we use infrared

1240
00:41:11,190 --> 00:41:09,359
cameras

1241
00:41:12,630 --> 00:41:11,200
um so if you're getting a picture of

1242
00:41:13,430 --> 00:41:12,640
something aren't you getting a heat

1243
00:41:15,430 --> 00:41:13,440
signature

1244
00:41:17,670 --> 00:41:15,440
it's an infrared camera you can only see

1245
00:41:19,990 --> 00:41:17,680
it if it has a heat signature

1246
00:41:21,990 --> 00:41:20,000
well that's not true you you what you

1247
00:41:23,510 --> 00:41:22,000
see is contrasting in temperatures it's

1248
00:41:25,270 --> 00:41:23,520
not necessarily heat you can also see

1249
00:41:27,670 --> 00:41:25,280
with infrared cameras cold spots

1250
00:41:28,630 --> 00:41:27,680
which is the absence of heat so my point

1251
00:41:30,710 --> 00:41:28,640
being is that

1252
00:41:32,309 --> 00:41:30,720
you know we have to be very careful when

1253
00:41:34,470 --> 00:41:32,319
we're looking at something if we see

1254
00:41:35,510 --> 00:41:34,480
something that that fits a conventional

1255
00:41:38,870 --> 00:41:35,520
model well

1256
00:41:40,710 --> 00:41:38,880
okay great but i guess my my word of

1257
00:41:43,430 --> 00:41:40,720
advice to anybody and this is including

1258
00:41:46,950 --> 00:41:43,440
folks in the government as well

1259
00:41:49,829 --> 00:41:46,960
always look at the second and third

1260
00:41:50,230 --> 00:41:49,839
order layers of data it's important not

1261
00:41:53,190 --> 00:41:50,240
to

1262
00:41:54,950 --> 00:41:53,200
and this is what we found in atip in

1263
00:41:56,790 --> 00:41:54,960
some cases it would help us find

1264
00:41:59,829 --> 00:41:56,800
conventional explanations

1265
00:42:01,589 --> 00:41:59,839
in other cases it didn't

1266
00:42:03,109 --> 00:42:01,599
you know if you see something an

1267
00:42:04,550 --> 00:42:03,119
accident on the street for example you

1268
00:42:06,470 --> 00:42:04,560
see two cars collide

1269
00:42:08,230 --> 00:42:06,480
and one naturally assumes one car hit

1270
00:42:10,710 --> 00:42:08,240
the other well

1271
00:42:11,910 --> 00:42:10,720
okay it may appear that way but but you

1272
00:42:13,190 --> 00:42:11,920
have to start that's where the

1273
00:42:15,589 --> 00:42:13,200
investigation

1274
00:42:16,470 --> 00:42:15,599
really is important that investigative

1275
00:42:19,589 --> 00:42:16,480
process

1276
00:42:21,430 --> 00:42:19,599
to make sure you're you're not assuming

1277
00:42:23,990 --> 00:42:21,440
or presuming something

1278
00:42:25,109 --> 00:42:24,000
simply based upon looking at something

1279
00:42:28,309 --> 00:42:25,119
in a video

1280
00:42:30,309 --> 00:42:28,319
sure sure um yeah it's really looks like

1281
00:42:31,190 --> 00:42:30,319
to me it looks like it is a glare of a

1282
00:42:32,790 --> 00:42:31,200
heat signature

1283
00:42:35,510 --> 00:42:32,800
which would be like something like a jet

1284
00:42:36,550 --> 00:42:35,520
like my my broader hypothesis with this

1285
00:42:38,790 --> 00:42:36,560
is that you know if you have

1286
00:42:39,750 --> 00:42:38,800
a heat source which i'm simulating here

1287
00:42:41,829 --> 00:42:39,760
with a light source

1288
00:42:43,430 --> 00:42:41,839
and you shine into the camera then you

1289
00:42:44,630 --> 00:42:43,440
get this glare around it which is much

1290
00:42:48,309 --> 00:42:44,640
bigger than the heat source

1291
00:42:50,790 --> 00:42:48,319
and we see this in videos of of jets

1292
00:42:52,069 --> 00:42:50,800
the heat source covers the jet itself it

1293
00:42:54,309 --> 00:42:52,079
actually something that does actually

1294
00:42:57,589 --> 00:42:54,319
happen

1295
00:42:59,030 --> 00:42:57,599
called lens flare yeah uh

1296
00:43:00,710 --> 00:42:59,040
that's not really lens flare lens flare

1297
00:43:01,990 --> 00:43:00,720
is the reflection though this is lens

1298
00:43:03,589 --> 00:43:02,000
flare over here

1299
00:43:05,510 --> 00:43:03,599
uh the reflection within the lens this

1300
00:43:07,990 --> 00:43:05,520
is glare uh

1301
00:43:10,390 --> 00:43:08,000
yeah but but your lens flare is creating

1302
00:43:12,230 --> 00:43:10,400
a a halo effect if you will

1303
00:43:13,670 --> 00:43:12,240
from the object and so a lot of people

1304
00:43:15,670 --> 00:43:13,680
have said well this is

1305
00:43:18,069 --> 00:43:15,680
you know this is an artifact of the

1306
00:43:18,710 --> 00:43:18,079
camera or this is lens flare or this is

1307
00:43:26,309 --> 00:43:18,720
a

1308
00:43:34,150 --> 00:43:26,319
this

1309
00:43:35,430 --> 00:43:34,160
to understand

1310
00:43:37,190 --> 00:43:35,440
temperature differences you have to

1311
00:43:39,030 --> 00:43:37,200
understand differences you have to all

1312
00:43:40,950 --> 00:43:39,040
those things to determine

1313
00:43:42,550 --> 00:43:40,960
i have done a lot of research on on this

1314
00:43:43,990 --> 00:43:42,560
uh but you know

1315
00:43:45,829 --> 00:43:44,000
one thing that you have really i think

1316
00:43:47,589 --> 00:43:45,839
sways the argument here is that in the

1317
00:43:49,430 --> 00:43:47,599
gimbal video you've got this

1318
00:43:50,870 --> 00:43:49,440
this sausage-shaped thing in the middle

1319
00:43:53,589 --> 00:43:50,880
which you say might not be a

1320
00:43:54,950 --> 00:43:53,599
a glib i think it's a glare and at some

1321
00:43:56,230 --> 00:43:54,960
point you see it rotate which is very

1322
00:43:57,670 --> 00:43:56,240
strange and it's the thing that gets

1323
00:43:59,510 --> 00:43:57,680
everybody excited

1324
00:44:01,030 --> 00:43:59,520
but if you look at the high high quality

1325
00:44:02,630 --> 00:44:01,040
versions of the video that were finally

1326
00:44:05,670 --> 00:44:02,640
released by the dod

1327
00:44:08,390 --> 00:44:05,680
you see that um the horizon stays

1328
00:44:09,510 --> 00:44:08,400
solid it stays at a certain angle um i

1329
00:44:10,630 --> 00:44:09,520
think it'd be this angle

1330
00:44:12,950 --> 00:44:10,640
and then you see this thing in the

1331
00:44:13,990 --> 00:44:12,960
middle here and you see it the shape of

1332
00:44:16,230 --> 00:44:14,000
this thing rotate

1333
00:44:17,750 --> 00:44:16,240
but you also see light patterns in the

1334
00:44:20,630 --> 00:44:17,760
sky rotate

1335
00:44:22,309 --> 00:44:20,640
uh coincidentally with uh this thing

1336
00:44:24,790 --> 00:44:22,319
here at the same time

1337
00:44:26,150 --> 00:44:24,800
uh which seems to suggest to me that

1338
00:44:28,069 --> 00:44:26,160
that it is in fact

1339
00:44:30,150 --> 00:44:28,079
the rotation isn't a rotation of the

1340
00:44:31,750 --> 00:44:30,160
object itself it's a rotation of the

1341
00:44:32,790 --> 00:44:31,760
something in the camera system which is

1342
00:44:34,790 --> 00:44:32,800
causing these

1343
00:44:36,069 --> 00:44:34,800
these reflected internal patterns to

1344
00:44:38,550 --> 00:44:36,079
rotate and

1345
00:44:40,470 --> 00:44:38,560
this glare to rotate is that something

1346
00:44:42,470 --> 00:44:40,480
that was even considered

1347
00:44:43,910 --> 00:44:42,480
yes sure was but you know when you look

1348
00:44:45,990 --> 00:44:43,920
at the horizon

1349
00:44:47,270 --> 00:44:46,000
the horizon doesn't change right that's

1350
00:44:49,829 --> 00:44:47,280
that's the whole point though i mean

1351
00:44:51,349 --> 00:44:49,839
no they it wouldn't change because uh

1352
00:44:53,270 --> 00:44:51,359
there's this thing in the cameras called

1353
00:44:56,550 --> 00:44:53,280
a de-rotation mechanism

1354
00:44:58,230 --> 00:44:56,560
uh that corrects for the the gross

1355
00:44:59,430 --> 00:44:58,240
gimbal movements of the camera

1356
00:45:01,589 --> 00:44:59,440
you know you know the the thing it's a

1357
00:45:03,910 --> 00:45:01,599
500 pound six foot long pod

1358
00:45:05,030 --> 00:45:03,920
and it's got this very heavy like front

1359
00:45:06,710 --> 00:45:05,040
thing at the end

1360
00:45:08,550 --> 00:45:06,720
and wait it when that thing does a big

1361
00:45:11,109 --> 00:45:08,560
rotation that thing itself weighs like

1362
00:45:12,550 --> 00:45:11,119
80 pounds or something it's got it's got

1363
00:45:14,309 --> 00:45:12,560
these big gears grinding and it kind of

1364
00:45:15,589 --> 00:45:14,319
jutters around so they try to minimize

1365
00:45:16,470 --> 00:45:15,599
the use of that and they use the

1366
00:45:18,710 --> 00:45:16,480
internal

1367
00:45:19,829 --> 00:45:18,720
um steered mirrors to actually track

1368
00:45:21,270 --> 00:45:19,839
things most of the time

1369
00:45:23,190 --> 00:45:21,280
but when it transitions over zero

1370
00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:23,200
degrees it has to rotate

1371
00:45:25,990 --> 00:45:24,640
and we see that in the videos you

1372
00:45:27,109 --> 00:45:26,000
actually see it in the floor one video

1373
00:45:28,550 --> 00:45:27,119
than in this video

1374
00:45:30,150 --> 00:45:28,560
and we see it in the gimbal video that

1375
00:45:32,069 --> 00:45:30,160
there is a rotation

1376
00:45:33,430 --> 00:45:32,079
uh and it seems like the entire light

1377
00:45:35,109 --> 00:45:33,440
field rotates and

1378
00:45:36,710 --> 00:45:35,119
this little object rotates which really

1379
00:45:39,349 --> 00:45:36,720
suggests to me that it's

1380
00:45:40,950 --> 00:45:39,359
the only way you're gonna get a horizon

1381
00:45:42,870 --> 00:45:40,960
to stay strong let's go back to then

1382
00:45:45,430 --> 00:45:42,880
some some study here let me grab

1383
00:45:45,990 --> 00:45:45,440
here grab this for a second forgive me

1384
00:45:48,150 --> 00:45:46,000
this nail

1385
00:45:49,510 --> 00:45:48,160
represents an object flying and this is

1386
00:45:51,510 --> 00:45:49,520
a horizon line

1387
00:45:52,550 --> 00:45:51,520
the only way i'm going to be able to

1388
00:45:54,950 --> 00:45:52,560
demonstrate

1389
00:45:56,870 --> 00:45:54,960
this rotating and this staying straight

1390
00:45:58,309 --> 00:45:56,880
is if i have two different cameras one

1391
00:46:01,750 --> 00:45:58,319
focused on this

1392
00:46:03,349 --> 00:46:01,760
that's focusing on this doesn't change

1393
00:46:04,150 --> 00:46:03,359
while the one focusing on this does

1394
00:46:05,829 --> 00:46:04,160
change

1395
00:46:08,790 --> 00:46:05,839
in this particular case you have one

1396
00:46:09,910 --> 00:46:08,800
camera focusing on both the horizon and

1397
00:46:11,670 --> 00:46:09,920
the object itself

1398
00:46:13,430 --> 00:46:11,680
and the orientation of the horizon does

1399
00:46:14,069 --> 00:46:13,440
not change consistent with the

1400
00:46:16,470 --> 00:46:14,079
orientation

1401
00:46:17,430 --> 00:46:16,480
of the object inside furthermore you

1402
00:46:21,430 --> 00:46:17,440
have

1403
00:46:23,109 --> 00:46:21,440
testimony of the individuals who got

1404
00:46:25,910 --> 00:46:23,119
pretty up close and personal to this

1405
00:46:26,710 --> 00:46:25,920
thing as it was rotating and again

1406
00:46:28,710 --> 00:46:26,720
you're seeing it

1407
00:46:30,150 --> 00:46:28,720
we have good do we do we actually have

1408
00:46:30,630 --> 00:46:30,160
eyewitness testimony i think we have we

1409
00:46:33,670 --> 00:46:30,640
have

1410
00:46:35,670 --> 00:46:33,680
the audio on the tape itself but

1411
00:46:37,190 --> 00:46:35,680
yeah we have a little bit of stuff you

1412
00:46:38,950 --> 00:46:37,200
might not have it but

1413
00:46:42,950 --> 00:46:38,960
it's there you have it you have so you

1414
00:46:46,710 --> 00:46:44,390
i'm a civilian right now i'm no longer a

1415
00:46:48,550 --> 00:46:46,720
public servant so i don't have it now

1416
00:46:50,150 --> 00:46:48,560
but i'm i'm very well aware of that case

1417
00:46:53,270 --> 00:46:50,160
yeah i think uh respectfully

1418
00:46:54,790 --> 00:46:53,280
uh i don't think you understand the the

1419
00:46:55,270 --> 00:46:54,800
argument i'm making with the rotating

1420
00:46:57,510 --> 00:46:55,280
glare

1421
00:46:58,710 --> 00:46:57,520
and the horizon and the maybe nice and

1422
00:47:00,230 --> 00:46:58,720
stable please please explain

1423
00:47:02,230 --> 00:47:00,240
uh we don't really i think we really

1424
00:47:04,950 --> 00:47:02,240
have time to get into it but basically

1425
00:47:05,750 --> 00:47:04,960
uh the camera system is mounted on two

1426
00:47:08,630 --> 00:47:05,760
axes

1427
00:47:10,230 --> 00:47:08,640
uh externally the big you know external

1428
00:47:13,430 --> 00:47:10,240
600 pound thing

1429
00:47:14,790 --> 00:47:13,440
uh and because because of that you can't

1430
00:47:15,670 --> 00:47:14,800
actually track something from left to

1431
00:47:17,750 --> 00:47:15,680
right

1432
00:47:19,670 --> 00:47:17,760
ahead of the the forward position just

1433
00:47:22,069 --> 00:47:19,680
with that gimbal system

1434
00:47:23,030 --> 00:47:22,079
uh so when it transitions zero degrees

1435
00:47:25,910 --> 00:47:23,040
and this is something that's mentioned

1436
00:47:28,549 --> 00:47:25,920
in the pattern it has to do a rotation

1437
00:47:31,589 --> 00:47:28,559
a physical rotation of the whole system

1438
00:47:33,510 --> 00:47:31,599
now this would make the image rotate

1439
00:47:35,349 --> 00:47:33,520
so to counter that it has an internal

1440
00:47:37,190 --> 00:47:35,359
system called a derotation system

1441
00:47:39,270 --> 00:47:37,200
which rotates the image back so that the

1442
00:47:40,870 --> 00:47:39,280
horizon doesn't move

1443
00:47:42,390 --> 00:47:40,880
so you've got this this camera going

1444
00:47:42,870 --> 00:47:42,400
like this and then it does this little

1445
00:47:44,230 --> 00:47:42,880
flip

1446
00:47:46,950 --> 00:47:44,240
and then it carries on or it does a

1447
00:47:49,670 --> 00:47:46,960
couple of them uh corrections kind of

1448
00:47:50,069 --> 00:47:49,680
try to minimize image disruption and

1449
00:47:54,470 --> 00:47:50,079
then

1450
00:47:55,990 --> 00:47:54,480
is de-rotated so

1451
00:47:57,270 --> 00:47:56,000
from the pilot's perspective you don't

1452
00:47:58,790 --> 00:47:57,280
see anything it just looks like you're

1453
00:47:59,910 --> 00:47:58,800
tracking from left to right across zero

1454
00:48:01,510 --> 00:47:59,920
degrees everything is fine

1455
00:48:04,150 --> 00:48:01,520
but because there's been a rotation of

1456
00:48:05,990 --> 00:48:04,160
the camera and because the glare

1457
00:48:08,390 --> 00:48:06,000
is relative to the orientation of the

1458
00:48:11,750 --> 00:48:08,400
camera this makes the glare rotate but

1459
00:48:16,069 --> 00:48:14,230
i'm not sure i'm tracking i i apologize

1460
00:48:19,270 --> 00:48:16,079
i i think what you're saying is that

1461
00:48:21,510 --> 00:48:19,280
the the software is correcting

1462
00:48:22,309 --> 00:48:21,520
is somehow keeping the horizon line

1463
00:48:24,470 --> 00:48:22,319
straight

1464
00:48:26,309 --> 00:48:24,480
um but because the physical attribute of

1465
00:48:27,589 --> 00:48:26,319
the camera having to rotate the object

1466
00:48:29,910 --> 00:48:27,599
is rotating but

1467
00:48:31,349 --> 00:48:29,920
i i'm not familiar with the system not

1468
00:48:35,829 --> 00:48:31,359
flipping the

1469
00:48:39,030 --> 00:48:35,839
the if you're going to rotate the object

1470
00:48:40,549 --> 00:48:39,040
while not rotating the horizon yeah

1471
00:48:42,470 --> 00:48:40,559
it's not rotating the object though it's

1472
00:48:44,710 --> 00:48:42,480
rotating a glare like a

1473
00:48:46,470 --> 00:48:44,720
the shape of the glare uh like like oh

1474
00:48:49,190 --> 00:48:46,480
my teacher saying oh okay okay yeah

1475
00:48:50,870 --> 00:48:49,200
yeah you're saying the okay so you're

1476
00:48:53,430 --> 00:48:50,880
presuming or assuming that

1477
00:48:54,230 --> 00:48:53,440
the object inside is is not even perhaps

1478
00:48:56,390 --> 00:48:54,240
a knob you're just

1479
00:48:57,270 --> 00:48:56,400
you're just referring to the to if it

1480
00:48:59,030 --> 00:48:57,280
was a glare

1481
00:49:00,309 --> 00:48:59,040
and yeah well i mean i think it's i

1482
00:49:02,549 --> 00:49:00,319
think it's an object like you know this

1483
00:49:04,870 --> 00:49:02,559
flashlight is an object but when we turn

1484
00:49:06,950 --> 00:49:04,880
it to the camera all we see is the glare

1485
00:49:08,549 --> 00:49:06,960
and then if i was to rotate this camera

1486
00:49:08,870 --> 00:49:08,559
uh you could see the glare rotate even

1487
00:49:10,950 --> 00:49:08,880
though

1488
00:49:12,150 --> 00:49:10,960
yeah so so what your what your

1489
00:49:13,349 --> 00:49:12,160
hypothesis is

1490
00:49:14,230 --> 00:49:13,359
correct me if i'm wrong but let me i

1491
00:49:15,990 --> 00:49:14,240
just want to make sure i get this

1492
00:49:18,790 --> 00:49:16,000
correct your hypothesis

1493
00:49:20,390 --> 00:49:18,800
is that the object that that is that is

1494
00:49:22,069 --> 00:49:20,400
creating that glare you're not

1495
00:49:23,430 --> 00:49:22,079
actually seeing in the camera you're

1496
00:49:25,829 --> 00:49:23,440
only seeing the glare

1497
00:49:27,349 --> 00:49:25,839
is that one yeah so yeah so i'm thinking

1498
00:49:29,990 --> 00:49:27,359
you're looking basically

1499
00:49:30,549 --> 00:49:30,000
at the tailpipe of an f a18 that's like

1500
00:49:32,230 --> 00:49:30,559
you know

1501
00:49:33,430 --> 00:49:32,240
10 miles away no i i understand what

1502
00:49:35,349 --> 00:49:33,440
you're saying i i will have to

1503
00:49:38,549 --> 00:49:35,359
respectfully dis disagree

1504
00:49:40,630 --> 00:49:38,559
um and again uh please don't

1505
00:49:42,150 --> 00:49:40,640
i'm not um i'm certainly not trying to

1506
00:49:44,870 --> 00:49:42,160
be argumentative here

1507
00:49:46,950 --> 00:49:44,880
but the data that that we had did not

1508
00:49:47,750 --> 00:49:46,960
did not demonstrate that you were just

1509
00:49:50,150 --> 00:49:47,760
looking at

1510
00:49:51,750 --> 00:49:50,160
at a glare uh all right we've already

1511
00:49:52,470 --> 00:49:51,760
got eight minutes left so i want to just

1512
00:49:55,589 --> 00:49:52,480
really quickly

1513
00:49:59,030 --> 00:49:55,599
get on to uh the go fast video uh

1514
00:50:00,710 --> 00:49:59,040
okay uh now the gophers video it was

1515
00:50:02,710 --> 00:50:00,720
said originally that it was a

1516
00:50:03,829 --> 00:50:02,720
low and fast object but if you do the

1517
00:50:05,750 --> 00:50:03,839
math on the

1518
00:50:08,150 --> 00:50:05,760
the range and the angles that are shown

1519
00:50:10,630 --> 00:50:08,160
on screen you can see that it's actually

1520
00:50:11,349 --> 00:50:10,640
a high and slow object are you familiar

1521
00:50:14,630 --> 00:50:11,359
with this

1522
00:50:16,870 --> 00:50:14,640
discrepancy well i'm familiar with the

1523
00:50:19,270 --> 00:50:16,880
alleged discrepancy but that is not

1524
00:50:19,910 --> 00:50:19,280
the position of those that were inside

1525
00:50:23,190 --> 00:50:19,920
the government

1526
00:50:25,349 --> 00:50:23,200
um so you know i i i'm always

1527
00:50:26,470 --> 00:50:25,359
i think an alternative hypothesis is

1528
00:50:28,230 --> 00:50:26,480
always uh

1529
00:50:29,670 --> 00:50:28,240
interesting and always worth having a

1530
00:50:31,030 --> 00:50:29,680
discussion about it's pretty

1531
00:50:32,470 --> 00:50:31,040
straightforward math though i mean would

1532
00:50:34,710 --> 00:50:32,480
that imply that the

1533
00:50:36,150 --> 00:50:34,720
the readings that are displayed on

1534
00:50:37,589 --> 00:50:36,160
screen are actually wrong the angle and

1535
00:50:38,870 --> 00:50:37,599
the range

1536
00:50:40,150 --> 00:50:38,880
well that's a question we'd have to go

1537
00:50:41,910 --> 00:50:40,160
back with isn't it that's a question

1538
00:50:43,910 --> 00:50:41,920
that we'd have to go back and and figure

1539
00:50:46,230 --> 00:50:43,920
out why there's a discrepancy

1540
00:50:47,109 --> 00:50:46,240
uh i can tell you that that several

1541
00:50:49,750 --> 00:50:47,119
individuals

1542
00:50:50,630 --> 00:50:49,760
that were very qualified particularly in

1543
00:50:53,030 --> 00:50:50,640
that particular

1544
00:50:55,430 --> 00:50:53,040
collection platform uh were able to

1545
00:50:55,910 --> 00:50:55,440
discern that this was an object that was

1546
00:50:58,950 --> 00:50:55,920
indeed

1547
00:51:00,309 --> 00:50:58,960
moving at a fairly fast speed i can't

1548
00:51:02,630 --> 00:51:00,319
tell you what that speed is

1549
00:51:04,069 --> 00:51:02,640
uh but i but i know what that's what was

1550
00:51:04,790 --> 00:51:04,079
indicated to me after quite a bit of

1551
00:51:06,390 --> 00:51:04,800
analysis

1552
00:51:08,069 --> 00:51:06,400
and by the way let me make this clear it

1553
00:51:09,829 --> 00:51:08,079
wasn't world according to luke or it

1554
00:51:10,790 --> 00:51:09,839
wasn't even world according to atyp we

1555
00:51:13,910 --> 00:51:10,800
we had

1556
00:51:16,230 --> 00:51:13,920
truly some of the finest engineers and

1557
00:51:18,230 --> 00:51:16,240
scientists and and other organizations

1558
00:51:19,990 --> 00:51:18,240
within the intelligence community

1559
00:51:22,710 --> 00:51:20,000
providing that data to us because we're

1560
00:51:25,109 --> 00:51:22,720
not engineers right so we really needed

1561
00:51:25,829 --> 00:51:25,119
those experts to tell us what it is we

1562
00:51:29,510 --> 00:51:25,839
were seeing

1563
00:51:32,069 --> 00:51:29,520
and then the discussion with the pilots

1564
00:51:34,069 --> 00:51:32,079
were also very interesting because

1565
00:51:36,230 --> 00:51:34,079
according to them and according to again

1566
00:51:37,190 --> 00:51:36,240
radar data not just what you see in the

1567
00:51:39,670 --> 00:51:37,200
camera

1568
00:51:40,309 --> 00:51:39,680
that the performance characteristics of

1569
00:51:41,829 --> 00:51:40,319
of

1570
00:51:43,030 --> 00:51:41,839
this object in particular the way i

1571
00:51:44,150 --> 00:51:43,040
presume you're talking about again go

1572
00:51:47,190 --> 00:51:44,160
fast is that correct

1573
00:51:50,470 --> 00:51:47,200
yeah yeah that that there was some uh

1574
00:51:52,470 --> 00:51:50,480
very compelling um

1575
00:51:54,309 --> 00:51:52,480
signatures associated with that with

1576
00:51:55,750 --> 00:51:54,319
that video all right so you you have

1577
00:51:57,910 --> 00:51:55,760
access so you've had access

1578
00:51:59,510 --> 00:51:57,920
uh to addition i do not have access now

1579
00:52:01,270 --> 00:51:59,520
and and let me again let me make this

1580
00:52:02,549 --> 00:52:01,280
clear because

1581
00:52:03,750 --> 00:52:02,559
i have a non-disclosure agreement with

1582
00:52:05,349 --> 00:52:03,760
the government and i know it drives

1583
00:52:09,109 --> 00:52:05,359
people nuts

1584
00:52:11,589 --> 00:52:09,119
but i do not have access to that data

1585
00:52:13,030 --> 00:52:11,599
now or anymore but fortunately there are

1586
00:52:15,030 --> 00:52:13,040
people in the government that do

1587
00:52:16,630 --> 00:52:15,040
and they have a lot more information

1588
00:52:19,030 --> 00:52:16,640
than just that

1589
00:52:19,670 --> 00:52:19,040
so again i guess my word of advice to

1590
00:52:23,990 --> 00:52:19,680
anybody

1591
00:52:26,549 --> 00:52:24,000
to myself and everybody

1592
00:52:28,790 --> 00:52:26,559
we try our best to avoid single source

1593
00:52:30,950 --> 00:52:28,800
reporting it's very important to

1594
00:52:32,230 --> 00:52:30,960
when you are looking at something have

1595
00:52:34,390 --> 00:52:32,240
all the available

1596
00:52:35,829 --> 00:52:34,400
data that you can have in order to

1597
00:52:38,390 --> 00:52:35,839
cross-reference

1598
00:52:40,230 --> 00:52:38,400
um what you're seeing because seeing

1599
00:52:41,910 --> 00:52:40,240
something is only part of the picture

1600
00:52:43,750 --> 00:52:41,920
and again remember what you're seeing

1601
00:52:46,309 --> 00:52:43,760
may only be a portion of

1602
00:52:47,270 --> 00:52:46,319
of of an event it may not be the entire

1603
00:52:48,870 --> 00:52:47,280
event

1604
00:52:51,190 --> 00:52:48,880
all right uh wait i know i'm not going

1605
00:52:51,910 --> 00:52:51,200
to get to all my questions that i have

1606
00:52:53,430 --> 00:52:51,920
here but i

1607
00:52:55,510 --> 00:52:53,440
want to just do one more thing that i

1608
00:52:57,030 --> 00:52:55,520
want to discuss briefly with you the uh

1609
00:52:58,390 --> 00:52:57,040
there was a chase there was a case uh

1610
00:53:00,710 --> 00:52:58,400
published by leslie keane in the

1611
00:53:04,390 --> 00:53:00,720
huffington post about the chilean navy

1612
00:53:05,990 --> 00:53:04,400
the chilean navy they saw a object ahead

1613
00:53:07,589 --> 00:53:06,000
of them and it looked like it was just

1614
00:53:08,630 --> 00:53:07,599
some kind of black blob on the ir and

1615
00:53:09,589 --> 00:53:08,640
they couldn't really make it out in the

1616
00:53:11,109 --> 00:53:09,599
tv mode

1617
00:53:12,870 --> 00:53:11,119
it started spewing out some stuff out of

1618
00:53:17,430 --> 00:53:12,880
the back and it was investigated

1619
00:53:19,430 --> 00:53:17,440
as a ufo by uh safer i think ce ffa oh

1620
00:53:20,470 --> 00:53:19,440
yes if i looked like a contrail like a

1621
00:53:22,630 --> 00:53:20,480
black contract

1622
00:53:23,910 --> 00:53:22,640
coming out at the end yes i think i'm

1623
00:53:25,430 --> 00:53:23,920
familiar with it

1624
00:53:27,030 --> 00:53:25,440
yeah and that was something they

1625
00:53:28,549 --> 00:53:27,040
investigated for two years and

1626
00:53:30,069 --> 00:53:28,559
leslie keane if you look at her original

1627
00:53:31,750 --> 00:53:30,079
article she said like he was highly

1628
00:53:33,349 --> 00:53:31,760
trained navy pilots who were you know

1629
00:53:34,470 --> 00:53:33,359
trained to observe these things

1630
00:53:35,910 --> 00:53:34,480
and then they had this whole team of

1631
00:53:37,030 --> 00:53:35,920
people they all sat around the table and

1632
00:53:39,430 --> 00:53:37,040
they sent out

1633
00:53:41,190 --> 00:53:39,440
uh to other places to get get sources

1634
00:53:43,030 --> 00:53:41,200
and they looked at the radar data

1635
00:53:44,870 --> 00:53:43,040
uh in the area i can tell you from my

1636
00:53:47,589 --> 00:53:44,880
perspective and i also want to say this

1637
00:53:49,589 --> 00:53:47,599
i'm unqualified to make this assessment

1638
00:53:50,870 --> 00:53:49,599
you know to me it looks when you look at

1639
00:53:52,710 --> 00:53:50,880
the video looks like a plane

1640
00:53:54,150 --> 00:53:52,720
looks like an aircraft traveling at a

1641
00:53:55,109 --> 00:53:54,160
relative you know cruising altitude

1642
00:53:57,190 --> 00:53:55,119
cruising speed

1643
00:53:58,150 --> 00:53:57,200
but i wasn't there for that and i i will

1644
00:54:00,630 --> 00:53:58,160
tell you now i

1645
00:54:01,829 --> 00:54:00,640
do not nor did i have access to any of

1646
00:54:04,390 --> 00:54:01,839
the data

1647
00:54:07,430 --> 00:54:04,400
that the that uh the chilean military

1648
00:54:09,109 --> 00:54:07,440
had access to so i i guess

1649
00:54:10,870 --> 00:54:09,119
my point here is that you know we've got

1650
00:54:12,230 --> 00:54:10,880
this this group of highly trained people

1651
00:54:13,910 --> 00:54:12,240
like the chilean i mean i'm

1652
00:54:15,589 --> 00:54:13,920
probably not as good as the the us the

1653
00:54:17,270 --> 00:54:15,599
u.s navy but yeah they're still there

1654
00:54:19,750 --> 00:54:17,280
no they're good people hey listen you

1655
00:54:20,950 --> 00:54:19,760
know what to to fly a multi-million

1656
00:54:22,390 --> 00:54:20,960
dollar weapon system

1657
00:54:24,069 --> 00:54:22,400
there's no such thing as not being good

1658
00:54:25,910 --> 00:54:24,079
there may be people that are better

1659
00:54:27,190 --> 00:54:25,920
but they're all good yeah i think it's a

1660
00:54:29,750 --> 00:54:27,200
helicopter pilot uh

1661
00:54:30,390 --> 00:54:29,760
but my point is they couldn't figure out

1662
00:54:32,309 --> 00:54:30,400
what it was

1663
00:54:33,990 --> 00:54:32,319
after two years and then they released

1664
00:54:36,150 --> 00:54:34,000
the video and

1665
00:54:37,990 --> 00:54:36,160
uh within a week people on the internet

1666
00:54:40,470 --> 00:54:38,000
tracked down exactly what plane it was

1667
00:54:41,670 --> 00:54:40,480
it was as you said it was a plane uh and

1668
00:54:42,950 --> 00:54:41,680
those things that looked like contrails

1669
00:54:43,990 --> 00:54:42,960
were actually contrails there were a

1670
00:54:47,270 --> 00:54:44,000
type of control called

1671
00:54:48,150 --> 00:54:47,280
aerodynamics surprised yeah uh but you

1672
00:54:49,910 --> 00:54:48,160
know if

1673
00:54:51,349 --> 00:54:49,920
that big team of people can spend two

1674
00:54:51,990 --> 00:54:51,359
years looking at something and get it

1675
00:54:54,549 --> 00:54:52,000
wrong

1676
00:54:56,069 --> 00:54:54,559
what's to say that you haven't done that

1677
00:54:56,710 --> 00:54:56,079
yeah well i can't speak for the chile

1678
00:54:58,549 --> 00:54:56,720
again

1679
00:55:00,069 --> 00:54:58,559
back to what i said i can't speak for

1680
00:55:03,270 --> 00:55:00,079
for the chilean armed forces i

1681
00:55:05,030 --> 00:55:03,280
i don't know when they had who they had

1682
00:55:06,470 --> 00:55:05,040
looking at it i can only speak from my

1683
00:55:07,349 --> 00:55:06,480
perspective with the united states

1684
00:55:09,829 --> 00:55:07,359
government

1685
00:55:11,270 --> 00:55:09,839
um you know you're asking me to to

1686
00:55:15,109 --> 00:55:11,280
hypothesize

1687
00:55:17,510 --> 00:55:15,119
the the capabilities of of

1688
00:55:18,390 --> 00:55:17,520
aerospace engineers if they were used at

1689
00:55:20,390 --> 00:55:18,400
all

1690
00:55:21,670 --> 00:55:20,400
in chile right but a bunch of nerds on

1691
00:55:23,510 --> 00:55:21,680
the internet

1692
00:55:25,030 --> 00:55:23,520
figured it out in in less than a week i

1693
00:55:25,430 --> 00:55:25,040
think it was about three days before

1694
00:55:29,510 --> 00:55:25,440
that

1695
00:55:31,190 --> 00:55:29,520
to the wonderful world of of social

1696
00:55:34,309 --> 00:55:31,200
media the world wide web

1697
00:55:36,230 --> 00:55:34,319
this is exactly why the uap issue

1698
00:55:37,510 --> 00:55:36,240
on on social media and as we're seeing

1699
00:55:39,990 --> 00:55:37,520
now on twitter

1700
00:55:41,589 --> 00:55:40,000
is is so good because you you're getting

1701
00:55:42,789 --> 00:55:41,599
a lot of different perspectives in a lot

1702
00:55:44,390 --> 00:55:42,799
of different minds

1703
00:55:46,470 --> 00:55:44,400
looking at the looking at the same

1704
00:55:49,670 --> 00:55:46,480
object but i i can tell you what you

1705
00:55:52,870 --> 00:55:49,680
what i saw in that chilean video

1706
00:55:55,829 --> 00:55:52,880
um for me is is not

1707
00:55:56,870 --> 00:55:55,839
what compelled me to continue to pursue

1708
00:55:59,589 --> 00:55:56,880
this in the government

1709
00:56:00,789 --> 00:55:59,599
uh what i was privy to was far more

1710
00:56:03,910 --> 00:56:00,799
compelling

1711
00:56:05,990 --> 00:56:03,920
than than what i saw in that chilean

1712
00:56:07,510 --> 00:56:06,000
video and by the way no disrespect to

1713
00:56:10,150 --> 00:56:07,520
to anybody who's been part of that

1714
00:56:11,430 --> 00:56:10,160
chilean video analysis because again i i

1715
00:56:13,670 --> 00:56:11,440
don't know them personally

1716
00:56:15,190 --> 00:56:13,680
and it's not a personal thing for me my

1717
00:56:17,349 --> 00:56:15,200
honest opinion

1718
00:56:19,349 --> 00:56:17,359
it looks like a like a typical standard

1719
00:56:21,430 --> 00:56:19,359
aircraft probably a commercial plane

1720
00:56:22,950 --> 00:56:21,440
uh you know maybe with a slight increase

1721
00:56:24,549 --> 00:56:22,960
in altitude and you're looking at its

1722
00:56:26,150 --> 00:56:24,559
contrails probably from twin engine i

1723
00:56:27,910 --> 00:56:26,160
suspect i don't know for sure

1724
00:56:29,270 --> 00:56:27,920
uh but it looked like that to me the

1725
00:56:30,069 --> 00:56:29,280
interesting thing about that case is if

1726
00:56:32,309 --> 00:56:30,079
you look at it

1727
00:56:33,670 --> 00:56:32,319
it is actually uh you can't see the

1728
00:56:35,190 --> 00:56:33,680
plane in the infrared

1729
00:56:36,870 --> 00:56:35,200
all you can see is the glare of the

1730
00:56:37,990 --> 00:56:36,880
engines which is a lot bigger than the

1731
00:56:39,750 --> 00:56:38,000
plane which is very similar to the

1732
00:56:40,789 --> 00:56:39,760
gimbal gimbal video but i guess my point

1733
00:56:45,030 --> 00:56:40,799
here is

1734
00:56:47,270 --> 00:56:45,040
uh i think this is why i

1735
00:56:48,470 --> 00:56:47,280
don't entirely believe and i don't

1736
00:56:49,990 --> 00:56:48,480
believe you i believe that you know what

1737
00:56:51,349 --> 00:56:50,000
you're saying is true but i think there

1738
00:56:52,549 --> 00:56:51,359
is possibility so that you may be

1739
00:56:53,750 --> 00:56:52,559
mistaken in your group being

1740
00:56:55,109 --> 00:56:53,760
mistaken even though they're highly

1741
00:56:57,030 --> 00:56:55,119
talented people and they've got all this

1742
00:56:57,750 --> 00:56:57,040
this extra information i still feel that

1743
00:56:59,990 --> 00:56:57,760
because

1744
00:57:01,109 --> 00:57:00,000
chilean government messed up well i'll

1745
00:57:03,430 --> 00:57:01,119
tell you one thing for sure

1746
00:57:05,109 --> 00:57:03,440
governments mess up all the time mr west

1747
00:57:06,150 --> 00:57:05,119
and and we're fooling ourselves if they

1748
00:57:07,829 --> 00:57:06,160
don't i mean

1749
00:57:09,829 --> 00:57:07,839
we're not going to go into anything

1750
00:57:12,150 --> 00:57:09,839
political here but we started wars off

1751
00:57:13,829 --> 00:57:12,160
mistakes okay so if anybody thinks that

1752
00:57:15,430 --> 00:57:13,839
their government is perfect

1753
00:57:17,510 --> 00:57:15,440
you know then i've got a bridge to sell

1754
00:57:20,470 --> 00:57:17,520
you but the government is trying

1755
00:57:22,230 --> 00:57:20,480
and i think that when you apply you know

1756
00:57:23,589 --> 00:57:22,240
the talent resources that we had

1757
00:57:25,270 --> 00:57:23,599
available

1758
00:57:26,470 --> 00:57:25,280
it paints a very compelling picture do

1759
00:57:27,670 --> 00:57:26,480
we have the interest no that's why

1760
00:57:29,750 --> 00:57:27,680
they're called uaps

1761
00:57:31,510 --> 00:57:29,760
because at the end of the day we don't

1762
00:57:32,309 --> 00:57:31,520
know what we're dealing with and maybe

1763
00:57:35,349 --> 00:57:32,319
it is

1764
00:57:37,109 --> 00:57:35,359
uh in some cases um you know something

1765
00:57:38,230 --> 00:57:37,119
that can be conventionally explained in

1766
00:57:40,789 --> 00:57:38,240
these three cases i

1767
00:57:42,390 --> 00:57:40,799
i beg to differ but that's okay because

1768
00:57:44,630 --> 00:57:42,400
that's that's the beauty about about

1769
00:57:47,510 --> 00:57:44,640
this conversation

1770
00:57:49,030 --> 00:57:47,520
ultimately you know the truth the truth

1771
00:57:50,069 --> 00:57:49,040
has nothing to fear the truth always

1772
00:57:53,670 --> 00:57:50,079
comes out

1773
00:57:55,190 --> 00:57:53,680
and if it turns out to be you know a kid

1774
00:57:57,030 --> 00:57:55,200
with remote controlled airplane with

1775
00:57:59,349 --> 00:57:57,040
some tinfoil wrapped around it to

1776
00:58:00,230 --> 00:57:59,359
you know spoof a camera then so be it

1777
00:58:03,910 --> 00:58:00,240
and we have an answer

1778
00:58:05,990 --> 00:58:03,920
right um and i i i think that's okay

1779
00:58:07,829 --> 00:58:06,000
yeah we're all searching for forensics

1780
00:58:08,870 --> 00:58:07,839
here and this is yeah and look as far as

1781
00:58:10,309 --> 00:58:08,880
belief i

1782
00:58:11,829 --> 00:58:10,319
look there's there's four categories of

1783
00:58:13,510 --> 00:58:11,839
people and i know we're going over my

1784
00:58:15,589 --> 00:58:13,520
time but let me let me finally just

1785
00:58:17,829 --> 00:58:15,599
digress here sure

1786
00:58:19,589 --> 00:58:17,839
there are four categories people the

1787
00:58:20,789 --> 00:58:19,599
first category of those no matter what

1788
00:58:23,270 --> 00:58:20,799
happens they're always going to be

1789
00:58:24,870 --> 00:58:23,280
believers the second category are those

1790
00:58:26,630 --> 00:58:24,880
people that believe now but they can

1791
00:58:26,950 --> 00:58:26,640
probably be convinced otherwise if

1792
00:58:28,950 --> 00:58:26,960
there's

1793
00:58:30,630 --> 00:58:28,960
compelling information the third

1794
00:58:31,430 --> 00:58:30,640
category of people are those people who

1795
00:58:33,990 --> 00:58:31,440
don't believe

1796
00:58:35,349 --> 00:58:34,000
but can probably convince otherwise if

1797
00:58:36,630 --> 00:58:35,359
there's compelling information and the

1798
00:58:37,829 --> 00:58:36,640
fourth category is

1799
00:58:40,230 --> 00:58:37,839
those people who are never going to

1800
00:58:42,710 --> 00:58:40,240
believe no matter what happens okay sure

1801
00:58:44,710 --> 00:58:42,720
my job is not to to convince anybody of

1802
00:58:46,309 --> 00:58:44,720
anything i'm not trying to

1803
00:58:48,230 --> 00:58:46,319
have any i don't i don't give a damn if

1804
00:58:48,870 --> 00:58:48,240
people believe me or not my focus has

1805
00:58:50,870 --> 00:58:48,880
been

1806
00:58:52,309 --> 00:58:50,880
getting the government engaged to figure

1807
00:58:52,870 --> 00:58:52,319
this out which is what it should be

1808
00:58:54,710 --> 00:58:52,880
doing

1809
00:58:56,309 --> 00:58:54,720
whether it's a balloon whether it's

1810
00:58:58,069 --> 00:58:56,319
little green men from mars

1811
00:59:00,789 --> 00:58:58,079
whether it's a russian uh new

1812
00:59:02,950 --> 00:59:00,799
surveillance platform or anything else

1813
00:59:04,470 --> 00:59:02,960
the government has a job to figure it

1814
00:59:07,589 --> 00:59:04,480
out and not ignore it

1815
00:59:09,829 --> 00:59:07,599
period full stop and so that is what

1816
00:59:12,069 --> 00:59:09,839
compels me to continue doing what i'm

1817
00:59:14,150 --> 00:59:12,079
doing and have this conversation

1818
00:59:15,589 --> 00:59:14,160
openly with anybody who wants to have it

1819
00:59:17,030 --> 00:59:15,599
i don't get paid a penny for this i

1820
00:59:18,470 --> 00:59:17,040
don't have my youtube channel i'm not

1821
00:59:20,549 --> 00:59:18,480
getting advertisements

1822
00:59:22,309 --> 00:59:20,559
you know i'm i'm doing this because i i

1823
00:59:25,349 --> 00:59:22,319
believe in what i'm doing

1824
00:59:26,950 --> 00:59:25,359
and i'm not going to focus on the first

1825
00:59:28,710 --> 00:59:26,960
category those people who who

1826
00:59:30,470 --> 00:59:28,720
are true believers and those people who

1827
00:59:32,710 --> 00:59:30,480
in the second the fourth category people

1828
00:59:33,990 --> 00:59:32,720
who no matter what we'll never believe

1829
00:59:35,829 --> 00:59:34,000
i'm not going to convince them either

1830
00:59:37,670 --> 00:59:35,839
way it's a waste of time

1831
00:59:39,829 --> 00:59:37,680
and so for you know i don't come out

1832
00:59:41,750 --> 00:59:39,839
here for people to say oh you know

1833
00:59:43,190 --> 00:59:41,760
i want you to believe in me or believe

1834
00:59:45,349 --> 00:59:43,200
what i'm saying

1835
00:59:46,789 --> 00:59:45,359
that's irrelevant what i'm trying to say

1836
00:59:48,230 --> 00:59:46,799
is get the data

1837
00:59:50,630 --> 00:59:48,240
get the government to do what it needs

1838
00:59:51,510 --> 00:59:50,640
to do collect more data so we can figure

1839
00:59:53,990 --> 00:59:51,520
this out

1840
00:59:55,829 --> 00:59:54,000
that's all this is about for me because

1841
00:59:57,750 --> 00:59:55,839
i've seen the compelling data

1842
00:59:59,190 --> 00:59:57,760
back when i was in the pentagon and it

1843
01:00:00,789 --> 00:59:59,200
was very compelling and i can tell you

1844
01:00:02,390 --> 01:00:00,799
that the senators and some of the people

1845
01:00:03,910 --> 01:00:02,400
in our government have received now

1846
01:00:05,990 --> 01:00:03,920
similar briefings with even more

1847
01:00:08,069 --> 01:00:06,000
relevant data and they are all

1848
01:00:09,589 --> 01:00:08,079
unanimously coming out saying the same

1849
01:00:11,030 --> 01:00:09,599
thing anybody who's received that

1850
01:00:11,750 --> 01:00:11,040
classified briefing has come out and

1851
01:00:14,470 --> 01:00:11,760
said

1852
01:00:16,390 --> 01:00:14,480
we need to take this seriously and and

1853
01:00:16,789 --> 01:00:16,400
that's that's my only that's really my

1854
01:00:20,470 --> 01:00:16,799
only

1855
01:00:21,990 --> 01:00:20,480
think you know i think we can both agree

1856
01:00:23,990 --> 01:00:22,000
that we need more data

1857
01:00:26,470 --> 01:00:24,000
yeah i'd love to have more data and and

1858
01:00:27,510 --> 01:00:26,480
we need more transparency into this yeah

1859
01:00:28,630 --> 01:00:27,520
i was suddenly put myself in the

1860
01:00:29,829 --> 01:00:28,640
category of people who would be

1861
01:00:31,589 --> 01:00:29,839
convinced uh

1862
01:00:33,750 --> 01:00:31,599
by compelling data i would say i would

1863
01:00:35,349 --> 01:00:33,760
love to see this this data that you

1864
01:00:37,109 --> 01:00:35,359
unfortunately are unable to share with

1865
01:00:38,950 --> 01:00:37,119
me uh but uh

1866
01:00:40,710 --> 01:00:38,960
you know for now well i i think that

1867
01:00:42,630 --> 01:00:40,720
data is is starting to come

1868
01:00:44,950 --> 01:00:42,640
to come out yeah i do think that'll be

1869
01:00:46,710 --> 01:00:44,960
right and it's coming out in a legal way

1870
01:00:50,549 --> 01:00:46,720
right where nobody gets in trouble so

1871
01:00:53,750 --> 01:00:50,559
yeah well uh i i have a huge

1872
01:00:55,109 --> 01:00:53,760
list of questions yet to be answered

1873
01:00:57,030 --> 01:00:55,119
unfortunately we didn't have time for it

1874
01:00:58,870 --> 01:00:57,040
but nick i'm happy to do this again

1875
01:01:00,230 --> 01:00:58,880
sometimes great absolutely great

1876
01:01:01,990 --> 01:01:00,240
yeah you got it you have an open

1877
01:01:03,430 --> 01:01:02,000
invitation stuff and a lot of people on

1878
01:01:03,670 --> 01:01:03,440
twitter asked me to ask you questions

1879
01:01:05,270 --> 01:01:03,680
and

1880
01:01:06,630 --> 01:01:05,280
we don't really have time so i know you

1881
01:01:07,910 --> 01:01:06,640
have a hard stop on the hour and you've

1882
01:01:09,510 --> 01:01:07,920
got a few minutes over which is

1883
01:01:11,510 --> 01:01:09,520
it's great so i just wanna thank you

1884
01:01:13,109 --> 01:01:11,520
very much uh for this time it's been a

1885
01:01:16,230 --> 01:01:13,119
very interesting conversation

1886
01:01:18,230 --> 01:01:16,240
and uh thank you so much okay thank you

1887
01:01:20,870 --> 01:01:18,240
you have an open invitation anytime

1888
01:01:21,349 --> 01:01:20,880
great thanks i will take it up so we got

1889
01:01:24,850 --> 01:01:21,359
it